...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is,
because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that has
a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued talking
about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the >>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is,
because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't even
understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary >>> bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
I posted this here to establish priority date. I already have
another person on a different forum that fully understands what
I am saying and are publishing my ideas as their own.
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is,
because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't
even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because it
is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.--
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer to it
by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is,
because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't
even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because it
is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies a
particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently
you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer to
it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic system
derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so
it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is, >>>>> because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't
even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that >>>>> has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative
Recursive Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or doesn't
know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong word,
which just shows your total ignorance about what you are talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together a coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you have no idea
what he said, but try to put your own false words into his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently
you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer to
it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so
it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually
is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and
don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving >>>>>> your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are >>>>>> arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop >>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names >>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said
above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with undecidability,
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive
Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or doesn't
know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong word,
which just shows your total ignorance about what you are talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together a
coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about Godel's
argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you have no
idea what he said, but try to put your own false words into his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently
you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR. >>>>
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer
to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so
it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/24 10:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just
LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven >>>>>>> in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually >>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and >>>>>>> don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are >>>>>>> arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop >>>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names >>>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because >>>>> it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read
what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
that are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
WHERE does he say that GODEL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM directly says
anything about DECIDABILITY?
Yes, there is a link between completeness and decidability, as an
incomplete system has an undecidable problem, that of the proof
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
generator for that statement, and a system with an undeciable problem is incomplete, as if we could prove the correct answer, then a theorem
prover could compute the answer, but they are different things.
And your complaint just shows you don't understand that.
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive
Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or
doesn't know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the topics. >>>
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong word,
which just shows your total ignorance about what you are talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together a
coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about
Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you
have no idea what he said, but try to put your own false words into
his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently >>>>> you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR. >>>>>
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer
to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them,
so it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/2024 9:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just >>>>>>>> LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven >>>>>>>> in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually >>>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and >>>>>>>> don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number >>>>>>>> that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your >>>>>>>> continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>> the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you >>>>>>>> are arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will >>>>>>> stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me >>>>>>> names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will >>>>>>> hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable
because it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read
what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
that are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
WHERE does he say that GODEL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM directly says
anything about DECIDABILITY?
Yes, there is a link between completeness and decidability, as an
incomplete system has an undecidable problem, that of the proof
*In other words you are totally retracting the line that I replied to*
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
That is good because I totally agree with the preceding line that you said.
generator for that statement, and a system with an undeciable problem
is incomplete, as if we could prove the correct answer, then a theorem
prover could compute the answer, but they are different things.
And your complaint just shows you don't understand that.
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive
Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or
doesn't know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the
topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong
word, which just shows your total ignorance about what you are
talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together
a coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about
Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you
have no idea what he said, but try to put your own false words into
his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because
apparently you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a
PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer >>>>>> to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, >>>>>> so it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/24 11:28 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 9:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for >>>>>>>>>> a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true >>>>>>>>>> or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just >>>>>>>>> LYING.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven >>>>>>>>> in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually >>>>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and >>>>>>>>> don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number >>>>>>>>> that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your >>>>>>>>> continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>>> the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you >>>>>>>>> are arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will >>>>>>>> stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me >>>>>>>> names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without
pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you. >>>>>>>>
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will >>>>>>>> hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable
because it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about.
(Read what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
that are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
WHERE does he say that GODEL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM directly says
anything about DECIDABILITY?
Yes, there is a link between completeness and decidability, as an
incomplete system has an undecidable problem, that of the proof
*In other words you are totally retracting the line that I replied to*
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
That is good because I totally agree with the preceding line that you
said.
No, because Godel was NOT talking about "undecidability" but "Incompleteness".
Even though there is a tie between the two topics, they are separate
topics.
This just shows that your native lanuguage is just LIES, as that is all
you can focus on.
Note, you have done NOTHING to refute all the errors I pointed out about your statements of Godel's proof, so you initial statement in the
paraphrase is still shown to be a LIE, and your whole proof just
incorrect and unsound, as you are by your basic nature.
Your concept of "Correct Reasoning" is NOT "Correct", or even really
based on "Reasoning", because you just don't understand either concept.
generator for that statement, and a system with an undeciable problem
is incomplete, as if we could prove the correct answer, then a
theorem prover could compute the answer, but they are different things.
And your complaint just shows you don't understand that.
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive
Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or
doesn't know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't
match your subject, because I understand your general confusion on
the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong
word, which just shows your total ignorance about what you are
talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together >>>>> a coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about
Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you
have no idea what he said, but try to put your own false words into >>>>> his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because
apparently you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a
PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to
refer to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its >>>>>>> interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic >>>>>>> system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, >>>>>>> so it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is, >>>>> because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't
even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that >>>>> has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative
Recursive Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or doesn't
know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong word,
which just shows your total ignorance about what you are talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together a coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you have no idea
what he said, but try to put your own false words into his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently
you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer to
it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so
it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually is, >>>>> because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and don't
even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number that >>>>> has a specific property. Until you understand that, your continued
talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving your
absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are
arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the >>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary >>> bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe, temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> >>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that >>>>> the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though. >>>
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
On 4/19/2024 6:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 11:28 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 9:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for >>>>>>>>>>> a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false >>>>>>>>>>> proves that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true >>>>>>>>>>> or false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just >>>>>>>>>> LYING.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
possibly be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be
proven in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G
actually is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" >>>>>>>>>> versions, and don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number >>>>>>>>>> that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your >>>>>>>>>> continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, >>>>>>>>>> proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of >>>>>>>>>>> language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>>>> the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you >>>>>>>>>> are arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar. >>>>>>>>>>
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I >>>>>>>>> will stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me >>>>>>>>> names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without >>>>>>>>> pointing
out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you. >>>>>>>>>
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will >>>>>>>>> hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable
because it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing >>>>>>>> statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it* >>>>>>
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about.
(Read what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements >>>>>> that are true.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
*Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
WHERE does he say that GODEL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM directly says
anything about DECIDABILITY?
Yes, there is a link between completeness and decidability, as an
incomplete system has an undecidable problem, that of the proof
*In other words you are totally retracting the line that I replied to*
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
undecidability,
That is good because I totally agree with the preceding line that you
said.
No, because Godel was NOT talking about "undecidability" but
"Incompleteness".
Even though there is a tie between the two topics, they are separate
topics.
Not according to this source
Undecidability
The non-existence of an algorithm or the impossibility of proving or disproving a statement within a formal system.
https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Undecidability#:~:text=The%20non%2Dexistence%20of%20an,statement%20within%20a%20formal%20system.
This just shows that your native lanuguage is just LIES, as that is
all you can focus on.
Note, you have done NOTHING to refute all the errors I pointed out
about your statements of Godel's proof, so you initial statement in
the paraphrase is still shown to be a LIE, and your whole proof just
incorrect and unsound, as you are by your basic nature.
Your concept of "Correct Reasoning" is NOT "Correct", or even really
based on "Reasoning", because you just don't understand either concept.
generator for that statement, and a system with an undeciable
problem is incomplete, as if we could prove the correct answer, then
a theorem prover could compute the answer, but they are different
things.
And your complaint just shows you don't understand that.
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive >>>>>> Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in >>>>>> finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or
doesn't know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't
match your subject, because I understand your general confusion on >>>>>> the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong
word, which just shows your total ignorance about what you are
talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put
together a coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to >>>>>> deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about
Godel's argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you >>>>>> have no idea what he said, but try to put your own false words
into his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because
apparently you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a >>>>>>>> PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to
refer to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about >>>>>>>> its interpretation and what can be proved from it in the
meta-logic system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE
them, so it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually
is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and
don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving >>>>>> your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are >>>>>> arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop >>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names >>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said
above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
I agree with this, and some other sources agree with this.
Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with undecidability,
*Other sources disagree*
*These two sources define Undecidability as Incompleteness*
Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
Undecidable
Not decidable as a result of being
*neither formally provable nor unprovable* https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Undecidable.html
Undecidability
The non-existence of an algorithm or the
*impossibility of proving or disproving a*
*statement within a formal system* https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Undecidability#:~:text=The%20non%2Dexistence%20of%20an,statement%20within%20a%20formal%20system.
in fact, the "computation" he described in the Primative Recursive
Relationship built is specifically one that is most assuredly
computable (for ANY number give to it, it WILL answer yes or no in
finite number of operations).
So, who has been lying about what they are talkinga about? (or doesn't
know the difference in the topics).
I answereed what you were talking about, even though it didn't match
your subject, because I understand your general confusion on the topics.
So, you are just needing to yell at YOUSELF for using the wrong word,
which just shows your total ignorance about what you are talking about.
Do you REALLY wonder why I point out your inability to put together a
coherent argument?
You just showed yourself guilty of trying to use a Red Herring to
deflect the arguement about how you are totally ignorant about Godel's
argement, and that you LIE about what he said, because you have no
idea what he said, but try to put your own false words into his mouth,
That you repeat the error after being corrected, because apparently
you can't understand how you are wrong, makes you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR. >>>>
You don't even understand what Godel's G even is, but try to refer
to it by the "Reader's Digest" version that talks about its
interpretation and what can be proved from it in the meta-logic
system derived from F.
The details HAVE been explained to you, and you just IGNORE them, so
it seems worthless to repeat them every time.
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just LYING. >>>>>>
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven in F. >>>>>>
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually
is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and
don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET, proving >>>>>> your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are >>>>>> arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop >>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names >>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because
it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that satisfies
a particular property, which will be a truth bearing statement (The
number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but incompletenwss,
which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read what you said
above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
*That is an excellent and correct foundation for what I am saying*
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Then "This sentence is not true" has the semantic value of {Nonsense}
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" has the semantic
value of {True}.
Although it may be difficult to understand that is exactly the
difference between Tarski's "theory" and "metatheory" simplified
as much as possible.
This is Tarski's Liar Paradox basis https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
That he refers to in this paragraph of his actual proof
"In accordance with the first part of Th. I we can obtain
the negation of one of the sentences in condition (α) of
convention T of § 3 as a consequence of the definition of
the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace 'Tr' in this convention
by 'Pr')." https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Allows his original formalized Liar Paradox:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
to be reverse-engineered from Line(1) of his actual proof:
(I changed his abbreviations of "Pr" and "Tr" into words)
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p // assumption
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p // assumption
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // derived from (1) and (2)
(4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True; // axiom: True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x) (6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
On 4/19/24 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just
LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven >>>>>>> in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually >>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and >>>>>>> don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you are >>>>>>> arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will stop >>>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me names >>>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable because >>>>> it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read
what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
that are true.
*That is an excellent and correct foundation for what I am saying*
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
IF you want to work with a Three Value logic system, then DO SO.
But, remember, once you make you system 3-values, you immediately loose
the ability to reference to anything proved in the classical two-value
Then "This sentence is not true" has the semantic value of {Nonsense}
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" has the semantic
value of {True}.
Although it may be difficult to understand that is exactly the
difference between Tarski's "theory" and "metatheory" simplified
as much as possible.
And, once you add that third value to logic, you can't USE Tarski, or
even talk about what he did, as it is OUTSIDE your frame of logic.
This is Tarski's Liar Paradox basis
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
That he refers to in this paragraph of his actual proof
"In accordance with the first part of Th. I we can obtain
the negation of one of the sentences in condition (α) of
convention T of § 3 as a consequence of the definition of
the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace 'Tr' in this convention
by 'Pr')." https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Allows his original formalized Liar Paradox:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
Right, He shows that this statement is EXPRESSABLE in the meta-theory (something I don't think you understand)
That is an adaptation of his Liar Paradox: x ∉ Tarski if and only if p
to be reverse-engineered from Line(1) of his actual proof:
(I changed his abbreviations of "Pr" and "Tr" into words)
Note, "Th I" was established without reference to the meaning of the class.
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p // assumption
NOT ASSUMPTION, he has shown that such an x must exist in the theory (if
it meets the requirements)
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p // assumption
NOT ASSUMPTION, but from the DEFINITION of what Truth is, the statement
x is true if and only if it is true (since p is the whole statement x)
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // derived from (1) and (2)
(4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True; // axiom: True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x) >> (6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
Right.
Thus proving that there exists and x where x must be true, and x must be unprovable.
You just don't understand what an "assumption" is and what is an
application of a proven statement.
On 4/19/2024 6:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/24 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>> that the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
Nope.
Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just >>>>>>>> LYING.
Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven >>>>>>>> in F.
You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually >>>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and >>>>>>>> don't even understand that.
Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number >>>>>>>> that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your >>>>>>>> continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>> the primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you >>>>>>>> are arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will >>>>>>> stop
talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me >>>>>>> names
if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing >>>>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will >>>>>>> hear nothing form me.
I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable
because it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
*That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read
what you said above).
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
that are true.
*That is an excellent and correct foundation for what I am saying*
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
IF you want to work with a Three Value logic system, then DO SO.
But, remember, once you make you system 3-values, you immediately
loose the ability to reference to anything proved in the classical
two-value
Then "This sentence is not true" has the semantic value of {Nonsense}
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" has the semantic
value of {True}.
Although it may be difficult to understand that is exactly the
difference between Tarski's "theory" and "metatheory" simplified
as much as possible.
And, once you add that third value to logic, you can't USE Tarski, or
even talk about what he did, as it is OUTSIDE your frame of logic.
For teaching purposes it is easier to think of it as
a third semantic value. In actuality it would be
rejected as invalid input.
This is Tarski's Liar Paradox basis
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
That he refers to in this paragraph of his actual proof
"In accordance with the first part of Th. I we can obtain
the negation of one of the sentences in condition (α) of
convention T of § 3 as a consequence of the definition of
the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace 'Tr' in this convention
by 'Pr')." https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Allows his original formalized Liar Paradox:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
Right, He shows that this statement is EXPRESSABLE in the meta-theory
(something I don't think you understand)
I do. I understand it better than most.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true.
That is an adaptation of his Liar Paradox: x ∉ Tarski if and only if p
to be reverse-engineered from Line(1) of his actual proof:
(I changed his abbreviations of "Pr" and "Tr" into words)
Note, "Th I" was established without reference to the meaning of the
class.
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p // assumption
NOT ASSUMPTION, he has shown that such an x must exist in the theory
(if it meets the requirements)
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p // assumption
NOT ASSUMPTION, but from the DEFINITION of what Truth is, the
statement x is true if and only if it is true (since p is the whole
statement x)
Convention T
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // derived from (1) and (2) >>> (4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True; // axiom: True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x) >>> (6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
Right.
Thus proving that there exists and x where x must be true, and x must
be unprovable.
You just don't understand what an "assumption" is and what is an
application of a proven statement.
Tarski assumes the Liar Paradox and finds out that this
assumption does not work out.
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it >>>>> <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that >>>>>> the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and >>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then >>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it >>>>>> <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that >>>>>>> the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and >>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe, >>>>> temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it >>>>>>> <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and >>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe, >>>>>> temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is >>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of >>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning} >>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature >>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it >>>>>>>> <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable >>>>>>>> and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is >>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning >>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of >>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every >>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning} >>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning >>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot >>>> possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it >>>>>>>> <is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable >>>>>>>> and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is >>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning >>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of >>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every >>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning} >>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning >>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot >>>> possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. >>>>>>>>> Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is >>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning >>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations >>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of >>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings. >>>>>>>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident >>>>>>> truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every >>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies >>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning >>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type >>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot >>>>> possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..." >>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the >>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is >>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning >>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations >>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of >>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings. >>>>>>>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident >>>>>>> truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every >>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning >>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type >>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot >>>>> possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..." >>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the >>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.
You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
don't need any teaching device.
As you make the syntax of your language dependent on semantics
you lose one of the greatest advantage of formal languages:
the simplicity of determination whether a string is a well formed
formula.
On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. >>>>>>>>>> Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). >>>>>>>>>>
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of >>>>>>>>>>> language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the >>>>>>>>>>> primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" >>>>>>>>> then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental >>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a >>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things, >>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning >>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations >>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings. >>>>>>>>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident >>>>>>>> truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the >>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally >>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every >>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally. >>>>>>>>>
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth, >>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies >>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden >>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type >>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..." >>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines
the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people >>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}. >>>>
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) >>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology >>>>
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible. >>>
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
in terms among common types.
Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
about things.
I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
On 4/20/24 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.
In other words, you admit that you are being inconsistant about what you
are saying, because your whole logic system is just inconsistant.
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
You don't seem to understand that predicates, DEFINED to be able to work
on ALL memebers of the input domain, must IN FACT, work on all members
of that domain.
For a Halt Decider, that means the decider needs to be able to answer
about ANY machine given to it as an input, even a machine that uses a
copy of the decider and acts contrary to its answer.
If you are going to work on a different problem, you need to be honest
about that and not LIE and say you are working on the Halting Problem.
And, if you are going to talk about a "Truth Predicate", which is
defined to be able to take ANY "statement" and say if it is True or not, with "nonsense" statements (be they self-contradictory statements, or
just nonsense) being just not-true.
ANY statement means any statement, so if we define this predicate as
True(F, x) to be true if x is a statement that is true in the field F,
then we need to be able to give this predicate the statemet:
In F de define s as NOT True(F, s)
If you claim that your logic is ACTUALLY "two-valued" then if True(F,s) returns false, because s is a statement without a truth value, then we--
have the problem that the definition of s now says that s has the value
of NOT false, which is True.
So, the True predicate was WRONG, as True of a statement that IS true,
must be true.
If True(F,s) is true, then we have that s is not defined as NOT true,
which is false, so the True predicate is again WRONG.
The predicate isn't ALLOWED to say "I reject this input" as that isn't a truth value (since you claimed you are actually useing a two-valued
logic) and this predicate is defined to ALWAYS return a truth value.
So, it seems you have a two-valued logic system with three logical values.
Which is just A LIE!
You are just proving you are too stupid to understand what you are
talking about as you don't understand the meaning of the words you are using, as you just studied the system by Zero order principles.
On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. >>>>>>>>>>> Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves >>>>>>>>>>>> that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or >>>>>>>>>>>> false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). >>>>>>>>>>>
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly >>>>>>>>>>>> be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of >>>>>>>>>>>> language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>>>>> the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>>>> truth"
then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a >>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>>>> truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things, >>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, >>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal >>>>>>>>>> universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on >>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations >>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings. >>>>>>>>>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of >>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident >>>>>>>>> truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the >>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally >>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of >>>>>>>>> every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of >>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their >>>>>>>>> meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths. >>>>>>>>>
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement, >>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason >>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally. >>>>>>>>>>
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth, >>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies >>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.) >>>>>>>>>>
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden >>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type >>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the >>>>>>> nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated >>>>>> not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction >>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference, >>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people >>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in" >>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}. >>>>>
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology >>>>>
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor >>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
invincible.
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
in terms among common types.
Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
about things.
Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]'; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
would take humans millions of man-years.
It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
I am not sure what you mean by MI.
seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
to have the Boolean value of true.
We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
{Cats} <are> {Animals}
{Animals} <are> {Living Things}
thus no need to store
{Cats} <are> {Living Things}
This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
On 4/20/2024 10:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/20/24 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.
In other words, you admit that you are being inconsistant about what
you are saying, because your whole logic system is just inconsistant.
Not at all.
An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
The notion of incompleteness and undecidability requires non truth
bearers to be construed as truth bearers.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary bearer of truth or falsity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
When we quit construing expressions that cannot possibly be true or
false as propositions then incompleteness and undecidability cease to
exist.
On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
are true.
Truth_Bearer(F, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F ((F ⊢ x) ∨ (F ⊢ ¬x))
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
Gödel is essentially saying that expressions that are not propositions
prove that a formal system of propositions has undecidable propositions.
You don't seem to understand that predicates, DEFINED to be able to
work on ALL memebers of the input domain, must IN FACT, work on all
members of that domain.
For a Halt Decider, that means the decider needs to be able to answer
about ANY machine given to it as an input, even a machine that uses a
copy of the decider and acts contrary to its answer.
If you are going to work on a different problem, you need to be honest
about that and not LIE and say you are working on the Halting Problem.
And, if you are going to talk about a "Truth Predicate", which is
defined to be able to take ANY "statement" and say if it is True or
not, with "nonsense" statements (be they self-contradictory
statements, or just nonsense) being just not-true.
ANY statement means any statement, so if we define this predicate as
True(F, x) to be true if x is a statement that is true in the field F,
then we need to be able to give this predicate the statemet:
In F de define s as NOT True(F, s)
If you claim that your logic is ACTUALLY "two-valued" then if
True(F,s) returns false, because s is a statement without a truth
value, then we have the problem that the definition of s now says that
s has the value of NOT false, which is True.
So, the True predicate was WRONG, as True of a statement that IS true,
must be true.
If True(F,s) is true, then we have that s is not defined as NOT true,
which is false, so the True predicate is again WRONG.
The predicate isn't ALLOWED to say "I reject this input" as that isn't
a truth value (since you claimed you are actually useing a two-valued
logic) and this predicate is defined to ALWAYS return a truth value.
So, it seems you have a two-valued logic system with three logical
values.
Which is just A LIE!
You are just proving you are too stupid to understand what you are
talking about as you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
using, as you just studied the system by Zero order principles.
On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used >>>>>>>>>>>> for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. >>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally. >>>>>>>>>>>>
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false >>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is >>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). >>>>>>>>>>>>
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot >>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of >>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>>>>> truth"
then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, >>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical >>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a >>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is >>>>>>>>>>> the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things, >>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific >>>>>>>>>>> model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of >>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same >>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and >>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal >>>>>>>>>>> universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some >>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its >>>>>>>>>> meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations >>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of >>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident >>>>>>>>>> truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the >>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally >>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of >>>>>>>>>> every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of >>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their >>>>>>>>>> meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths. >>>>>>>>>>
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement, >>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason >>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally. >>>>>>>>>>>
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth, >>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies >>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.) >>>>>>>>>>>
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, >>>>>>>>>>> though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of >>>>>>>> meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden >>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any >>>>>>>> type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that >>>>>>>> cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the >>>>>>>> nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies. >>>>>>>>
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated >>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto >>>>>>> ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction >>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference, >>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in" >>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type, >>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion, >>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction, >>>>>>> theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology. >>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all >>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of >>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to >>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your >>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on >>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
invincible.
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ..., >>>>> in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
in terms among common types.
Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
about things.
Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
would take humans millions of man-years.
It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
I am not sure what you mean by MI.
seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
to have the Boolean value of true.
We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
{Cats} <are> {Animals}
{Animals} <are> {Living Things}
thus no need to store
{Cats} <are> {Living Things}
This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
that the premises have to be drawable as random
draws and that it results the same deduction
regardless the order of the draws.
So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
"material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
a "truth table",
with regards to why a usual "model"
in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
bad ideas.
The premises, of deductive inference, if they're ina given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
then those _are not_.
The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
a model of reasoning can be very compact.
Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
"...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used >>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
similar
undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
<is>
literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
*Parphrased as*
Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
that
the
formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
false.
Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
be a
proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
primary
bearer of truth or falsity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the >>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
then
as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, >>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the >>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger >>>>>>>>>>>> logical
positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a >>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while >>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> is the
truth".
Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things, >>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific >>>>>>>>>>>> model,
as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a >>>>>>>>>>>> model of
belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the >>>>>>>>>>>> same
time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency >>>>>>>>>>>> and
inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal >>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
temporal.
Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are >>>>>>>>>>>> some
very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
reflections on
relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and >>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its >>>>>>>>>>> meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence >>>>>>>>>>>
In the case of the correct model of the actual world
stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite >>>>>>>>>>> strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of >>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the >>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally >>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of >>>>>>>>>>> every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of >>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their >>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths. >>>>>>>>>>>
The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement, >>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason >>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth, >>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies >>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.) >>>>>>>>>>>>
One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only >>>>>>>>>>>> that,
though.
"Bigger: not always worse."
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of >>>>>>>>> meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any >>>>>>>>> type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that >>>>>>>>> cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the >>>>>>>>> nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies. >>>>>>>>>
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy", >>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated >>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto >>>>>>>> ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical >>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth. >>>>>>>>
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same >>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction >>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference, >>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in" >>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen >>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
meaning}.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises, >>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class. >>>>>>>>
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type, >>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type, >>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion, >>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction, >>>>>>>> theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology. >>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
A complete
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all >>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of >>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to >>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your >>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
invincible.
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna schoolThe point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ..., >>>>>> in some places.
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
natural language would be tree walks.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
in terms among common types.
Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
about things.
Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
would take humans millions of man-years.
It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
I am not sure what you mean by MI.
seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
to have the Boolean value of true.
We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
{Cats} <are> {Animals}
{Animals} <are> {Living Things}
thus no need to store
{Cats} <are> {Living Things}
This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
that the premises have to be drawable as random
draws and that it results the same deduction
regardless the order of the draws.
I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
{Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
"material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
a "truth table",
I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
derive nonsense.
I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
steps of logic are inherently infallible.
They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
of logic.
with regards to why a usual "model"
in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
bad ideas.
You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper orderThe premises, of deductive inference, if they're ina given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
then those _are not_.
or there is no connection between inference steps.
The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
a model of reasoning can be very compact.
Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
It is not actually largely bunk.
It has the key issue that it lies its ass off. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
the actual world.
This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer. https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that >>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.
You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
don't need any teaching device.
That is too close to ad homimen.
If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
As you make the syntax of your language dependent on semantics
you lose one of the greatest advantage of formal languages:
the simplicity of determination whether a string is a well formed
formula.
Not at all. By combining them together we can simultaneously determine
syntactic and semantic correctness. By keeping them separate we have
misconstrued expressions that are not even propositions as propositions
that prove incompleteness and undecidability.
You have not shown that you can determine either semantic or syntactic correctness.
A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. Propositions are also often characterized as
being the kind of thing that declarative sentences denote.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
Therefore it were easier if you could easily check whether a particular string is a proposition or a sequence or propositions.
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