There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then which kind of “truth” is it?
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then which
kind of “truth” is it?
truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If so,
about which system is olcott talking?
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then which kind of “truth” is it?
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
a truth, too.
Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then which
kind of “truth” is it?
truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If so,
about which system is olcott talking?
On 4/6/2024 12:40 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then which
kind of “truth” is it?
The actual taste of strawberries and the actual smell of coffee
cannot be encoded in language. Declarative sentences in English
are how analytic truth is represented in English. Some declarative
sentences may be false. For English sentences the meaning of their
words determines their truth or falsity.
On 4/6/2024 2:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right >>>> now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
a truth, too.
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
It seems to me that morality can only be correctly addressed
through consequentialism. Bereft of a harmful effect there
can be no wrong.
https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/consequentialism
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 08:57:43 -0500, olcott wrote:
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
Is that your opinion?
On 4/6/2024 9:09 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 08:57:43 -0500, olcott wrote:
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
Is that your opinion?
It seems to be a fact that many notions of morality are culturally
relative.
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then >>> which
kind of “truth” is it?
truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If so,
about which system is olcott talking?
Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
On 4/6/2024 2:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right >>>> now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
a truth, too.
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
It seems to me that morality can only be correctly addressed
through consequentialism. Bereft of a harmful effect there
can be no wrong.
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
Op 06.apr.2024 om 16:01 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the >>>>>>> basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then >>>> which
kind of “truth” is it?
truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If
so, about which system is olcott talking?
Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
I try to read this as an answer to my questions, but without success.
Does olcott mean that the system I was asking for is the Cyc project?
And that these axioms are valid only within this project?
He adds another axiom: "Cats are animals is an axiom of natural
language". Is that also within this system?
Natural language is often ambiguous, or metaphorical. E.g., the word
"cat" is some times used for other things that are not animals. I don't
see how natural language can be used as an analytical system.
Op 06.apr.2024 om 16:01 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the >>>>>>> basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then >>>> which
kind of “truth” is it?
truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If
so, about which system is olcott talking?
Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
I try to read this as an answer to my questions, but without success.
Does olcott mean that the system I was asking for is the Cyc project?
And that these axioms are valid only within this project?
He adds another axiom: "Cats are animals is an axiom of natural
language". Is that also within this system?
Natural language is often ambiguous, or metaphorical. E.g., the word
"cat" is some times used for other things that are not animals. I don't
see how natural language can be used as an analytical system.
Op 06.apr.2024 om 15:57 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 2:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right
now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
a truth, too.
A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
It seems to me that morality can only be correctly addressed
through consequentialism. Bereft of a harmful effect there
can be no wrong.
That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
can easily become a cyclic reasoning.
Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the context.
On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right >>>> now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's scientific demarcation,
and the usual old idea that mathematics is
analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
"Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the >>>>>>> basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data >>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
context.
When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the >>>>>>>> basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense >>>>>>>> data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
context.
When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not use
such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also its context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the word 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.
Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the >>>>>>>> basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense >>>>>>>> data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
Can you offer a proof of that?
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
context.
When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not use
such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also its context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the word 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.
On 4/8/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:Can you offer a proof of that?
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on >>>>>>>>> the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense >>>>>>>>> data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room >>>>>>>>> right now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words. >>>>>>
Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
context.
When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not
use such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
Mathematically formalized natural language such that computers can
achieve the same degree of understanding as humans.
meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also
its context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the
word 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.
I don't think that this is the linguistic notion of context where the
meaning of a word is derived from its denotation and its context. This
is more of a case of picking one of several different denotations.
There is a great debate about whether an expression of language
can be true without a truth maker.
Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
A truth without a truthmaker is like a cake without a baker,
non-existent.
True and unprovable is self-contradictory once one understands
how true really works the way that I and Wittgenstein do. https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
On 4/2/2024 11:50 AM, olcott wrote:
There is a great debate about whether an expression of language
can be true without a truth maker.
Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
A truth without a truthmaker is like a cake without a baker,
non-existent.
True and unprovable is self-contradictory once one understands
how true really works the way that I and Wittgenstein do.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
Analytic truth seems to be essentially nothing more than relations
between finite strings. Copyright 2024 PL Olcott
*Here is my key basis for that*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis >>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right >>>> now."
Which kind of truth is that statement?
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's scientific demarcation, and the usual old idea that mathematics is
analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
"Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
can easily become a cyclic reasoning.
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
is empirical ...
On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 11:06:22 +0200, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
can easily become a cyclic reasoning.
We have an objective standard for determining “harm” and “good” though:
the healthcare industry. They have a precept “first, do no harm”, and a way of measuring what that means. It’s a standard that works well enough for most of us to literally bet our lives on it.
And this does not depend on the ideology of any religion.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from experience)?
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from experience)?
On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience >>> is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
“analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
experience)?
I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.
Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.
Natural language expressions are formalized using https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.
The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))
The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.
We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
experience
is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
“analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from >>> experience)?
I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.
Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.
Natural language expressions are formalized using
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.
The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))
The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.
We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
Of course type theory is great and natural language
has meaning, they're often associated with great
and extensive developments in such notions,
like Tesniere and Peirce.
So, you can lie together, yet,
that's not truth once discovered.
That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
for example how proof theory models proof theory and
model theory proves model theory,
and it's natural language in words and according to types,
is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
in the strings in my database".
That's called living in a box,
I see it a lot these days.
I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
of Russell, also.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
experience
is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as >>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from >>>> experience)?
I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.
Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.
Natural language expressions are formalized using
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.
The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))
The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.
We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
attack is valid inference.
Of course type theory is great and natural language
has meaning, they're often associated with great
and extensive developments in such notions,
like Tesniere and Peirce.
So, you can lie together, yet,
that's not truth once discovered.
That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
for example how proof theory models proof theory and
model theory proves model theory,
and it's natural language in words and according to types,
is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
in the strings in my database".
That's called living in a box,
I see it a lot these days.
I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
of Russell, also.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
On 04/27/2024 11:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
experience
is empirical ...
What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as >>>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from >>>>> experience)?
I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.
Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning. >>>>
This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.
Natural language expressions are formalized using
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.
The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨
False(L,
x)))
The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.
We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
attack is valid inference.
Of course type theory is great and natural language
has meaning, they're often associated with great
and extensive developments in such notions,
like Tesniere and Peirce.
So, you can lie together, yet,
that's not truth once discovered.
That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
for example how proof theory models proof theory and
model theory proves model theory,
and it's natural language in words and according to types,
is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
in the strings in my database".
That's called living in a box,
I see it a lot these days.
I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
of Russell, also.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
No, that's rhetoric.
That Montague and Russell are flakes and insincere hypocrites is technical.
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