• Re: Readings in (some of the) foundations of mathematics --- tree ofknowledge

    From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:44:48 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to persuade >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anybody that PTS somehow causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why would one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in language together into one coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite


    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>> unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>> sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies

    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical
    tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to
    be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be
    cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits
    my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world, or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions
    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.
    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:45:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic relations >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in language together into one coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>> sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical
    tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to
    be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be
    cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits
    my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions

    it tells us exactly one thong about the real world
    through the definition of terms.

    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.

    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 08:16:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/02/2026 07:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I don't believe you. You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth. If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in language together into one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>>> sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical >>>>>>> tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to
    be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be
    cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits
    my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions

    it tells us exactly one thong about the real world
    through the definition of terms.

    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.

    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.


    Animals are {cats, dogs, wallabies, llamas, aardvarks, crustaceans,
    ...}, a potentially infinitary expression.

    Class/set distinction about "theories-of-one-relation" vis-a-vis "elt"
    and "contains" is still a thing, and, then also ordering-theory is
    a "theory-of-one-relation" with "l.t.", about elt and lt, and
    elt and contains.

    Also there are words of all these things with use/mention distinction.


    So, class/set distinction in theories-of-one-relation and use/mention distinction in the analysis of words have their own semantics.


    "Inverting the tree" or "inverting the diamond" in type theory is,
    when narrowing and widening the types, a bit different for that
    there is narrowing/widening distinction, in the theory of types.

    class/set distinction
    use/mention distinction
    narrowing/widening distinction



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 11:47:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 10:16 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/02/2026 07:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meanings
    expressed in language together into one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x)
    is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are
    sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical >>>>>>>> tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to >>>>>>>> be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be >>>>>>>> cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits >>>>>>>> my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions

    it tells us exactly one thong about the real world
    through the definition of terms.

    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.

    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.


    Animals are {cats, dogs, wallabies, llamas, aardvarks, crustaceans,
    ...}, a potentially infinitary expression.


    Not even if you do each individual at a time
    that ever lived since the beginning of life
    on Earth is this an infinite set.

    How could a smart guy like you make such a
    huge mistake?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 11:41:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in language together into one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>>> sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical >>>>>>> tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to
    be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be
    cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits
    my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 12:15:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 18:16, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/02/2026 07:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meanings
    expressed in language together into one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x)
    is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are
    sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical >>>>>>>> tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to >>>>>>>> be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be >>>>>>>> cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits >>>>>>>> my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions

    it tells us exactly one thong about the real world
    through the definition of terms.

    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.

    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.


    Animals are {cats, dogs, wallabies, llamas, aardvarks, crustaceans,
    ...}, a potentially infinitary expression.

    In the naming rules of animal species an "animal" is whatever the
    author presents as an animal.

    The usual meaning of "animal" includes any living organism that
    is more closely related to Homo sapiens that is to msuhrooms,
    e.g., Agaricus campestris. Slime molds are sometimes included and
    included, sometimes excluded, and so are amoebas and some other
    microbes.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 12:39:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 17:22, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 22:40, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:39 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 2:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:43 AM, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 26/06/2026 16:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "grounding in a proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't mean you're capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The above is the key reason why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I don't believe you.  You have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> respect for or understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.  If you really want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cite an academic expert who'll have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some credibility. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If they are mere gibberish words to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you then you will not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression used only by you, and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a 'verified fact' when you haven't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is structured as a tree of semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    They use a tree structure for concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It must at least be a directed acyclic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    By looking upward in a type hierarchy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in language together into one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.

    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It should be obvious that finding a proof does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen before
    looking for a proof.


    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q

    There are, but that sequence is infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    If there is no FINITE sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q from ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    i.e., ~∃x x=S(x) is unprovable is Q, as is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    Is it commonly known that ~∃x x=S(x)

    Which has the semantic meaning "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" as per the definition of Q.


    Since there are no steps in Q that affirm ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q it is an open question in Q and not a confirmed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement in Q.

    In other words, unproven as is commonly known.

    Yet never gets to undecidable or in any sense of incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    False, as by definition, Q is incomplete because ~∃x x=S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable / out-of-scope / not semantically grounded in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Proof theoretic semantics DOES NOT DO IT THAT WAY !!!

    Irrelevant. The statement that both ∃x x=S(x) and ~∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>>> sentences of Q but neither is a rheorem or Q does not depend on >>>>>>>>>> any semantics.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
    can be represented as a semantic tautology in an
    acyclic directed graph. That knowledge is a DAG was
    my very thought on this subject more than 30 years ago.
    This single idea gets rid of all undecidability
    within the entire body of knowledge.

    No, it cannot. The usual meaning of knoledge excludes tautologies >>>>>>>
    You are not paying close enough attention. I did not say logical >>>>>>> tautology. I said semantic tautology. That cats are defined to
    be animals is a semantic tautology. That cats are defined to be
    cats is a logical tautology. Here is a definition of that fits
    my definition of semantic tautology.

    What I said applies to logical tautologies, too. That cats are
    defined to be animals only tells somthing (but not much) about
    the meanings of the words but nothing about the real world.

    When a complete set of general "atomic facts" of the
    actual world is encoded as axioms along with all of
    the semantic entailment relations between these facts
    then every element of general knowledge that can be
    expressed in language is known by this system.

    In order to achieve that the atomic facts must be non-tautologies.

    That "cats" <are> "animals" is a semantic tautology.

    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    or it can be a consequence of the
    definitions of "cat" and "animal" and terms used in these definitions

    it tells us exactly one thong about the real world
    through the definition of terms.

    that tells nothing about the real world, or it can be a statement
    about the real world that cannot be inferred from definitions alne.

    "atomic facts" that correspond to things in the world
    only have stipulation as their basis in truth within
    the formal system.

    One usually says "assumption" instead of "stipulation". The latter
    usually means a rfusal to proceed before the stipulation is accepted
    or an alternative agreed.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 10:23:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 11:43:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.


    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 10:34:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/03/2026 08:23 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.


    Yet: man is an animal, yet, man is not an animal.



    computer science 101


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 13:17:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 12:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 08:23 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.


    Yet:  man is an animal, yet, man is not an animal.



    By different definitions of animal that would have
    different GUIDs in my system. Most literally man
    is an animal and "man is not an animal" is objectively
    incorrect. That man has a different set of abilities
    than most animals is also being updated. Chimps have
    been proven capable of abstract thought.



    computer science 101


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 13:36:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/03/2026 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 08:23 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.


    Yet: man is an animal, yet, man is not an animal.



    By different definitions of animal that would have
    different GUIDs in my system. Most literally man
    is an animal and "man is not an animal" is objectively
    incorrect. That man has a different set of abilities
    than most animals is also being updated. Chimps have
    been proven capable of abstract thought.



    computer science 101





    Most thinking beings are feeling beings
    and most feeling beings are thinking beings.

    Not all, though, ....

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 18:14:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/03/2026 01:36 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 08:23 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called >>>>>>> an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.


    Yet: man is an animal, yet, man is not an animal.



    By different definitions of animal that would have
    different GUIDs in my system. Most literally man
    is an animal and "man is not an animal" is objectively
    incorrect. That man has a different set of abilities
    than most animals is also being updated. Chimps have
    been proven capable of abstract thought.



    computer science 101





    Most thinking beings are feeling beings
    and most feeling beings are thinking beings.

    Not all, though, ....


    It's usually given that thinkers can think feels
    moreso than feelers can feel thinks - yet, according
    to accounts of sense, that all thinkers have to feel.

    "I am not a number", while, "I is a number".


    Is "Three Dog Night" a "three-legged dog"?
    Is "One" the largest cardinal, or the loneliest number?


    I is a post-modern deconstructionist post-modern deconstructionist.

    Eco has a good book called "A Theory of Semiotics".


    "Science" is usually what a full account of logicist positivism is called.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 09:58:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 18:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    For some kind of formal semantics where the meaning of a fintite
    string is another finite string (or perhaps, in some cases, the
    same). That way does not get any real world semantics, though
    it can extend real world semantics if you already have some.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.

    They come from experiences about uses of those words by other people.
    Likewise for most of commonly used words and phrases.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 10:02:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 23:36, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/03/2026 08:23 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called >>>>>>> an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.


    Yet:  man is an animal, yet, man is not an animal.



    By different definitions of animal that would have
    different GUIDs in my system. Most literally man
    is an animal and "man is not an animal" is objectively
    incorrect. That man has a different set of abilities
    than most animals is also being updated. Chimps have
    been proven capable of abstract thought.



    computer science 101





    Most thinking beings are feeling beings
    and most feeling beings are thinking beings.

    Possibly but hard to determine as both thinking and feeling are
    often invisible. Synthetic prychology has shown that much can be
    achieved without either.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 10:22:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 08:24:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 1:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 18:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word
    "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells
    nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    For some kind of formal semantics where the meaning of a fintite
    string is another finite string (or perhaps, in some cases, the
    same). That way does not get any real world semantics, though
    it can extend real world semantics if you already have some.


    All of meaning expressed in language works this same way.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.

    They come from experiences about uses of those words by other people. Likewise for most of commonly used words and phrases.


    If this was true then Chinese would not exist.
    Stipulated relations between finite strings is
    the only way that language acquires meaning.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 08:29:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.


    It tells us exactly one thing.
    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general
    knowledge tells us everything that can be expressed
    in language. This finite list also has all of the
    kinds of relations between these facts.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Alan Mackenzie@acm@muc.de to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 14:07:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In sci.math olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general
    knowledge tells us everything that can be expressed
    in language. This finite list also has all of the
    kinds of relations between these facts.

    Seems doubtful. Falsehoods can also be expressed in language, together
    with that vast trove of expressions which are neither true nor false. In
    fact, when it comes to "everything that can be expressed in language", a
    list of "atomic facts" would appear to be unhelpful, just as much as a
    list of "atomic falsehoods" would be, whatever that might mean.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott
    --
    Alan Mackenzie (Nuremberg, Germany).

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:38:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 9:07 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In sci.math olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general
    knowledge tells us everything that can be expressed
    in language. This finite list also has all of the
    kinds of relations between these facts.

    Seems doubtful. Falsehoods can also be expressed in language, together
    with that vast trove of expressions which are neither true nor false. In fact, when it comes to "everything that can be expressed in language", a
    list of "atomic facts" would appear to be unhelpful, just as much as a
    list of "atomic falsehoods" would be, whatever that might mean.


    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general knowledge
    only includes true truth bearers and only facts that cannot
    be derived from anything else. This excludes falsehoods and
    expressions that are neither true nor false. It is the axiomatic
    basis of knowledge of the world.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Alan Mackenzie@acm@muc.de to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 17:42:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 9:07 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In sci.math olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general
    knowledge tells us everything that can be expressed
    in language. This finite list also has all of the
    kinds of relations between these facts.

    Seems doubtful. Falsehoods can also be expressed in language, together with that vast trove of expressions which are neither true nor false. In fact, when it comes to "everything that can be expressed in language", a list of "atomic facts" would appear to be unhelpful, just as much as a
    list of "atomic falsehoods" would be, whatever that might mean.


    A complete finite list of "atomic facts" of general knowledge
    only includes true truth bearers and only facts that cannot
    be derived from anything else. This excludes falsehoods and
    expressions that are neither true nor false. It is the axiomatic
    basis of knowledge of the world.

    WHOOOOSHHH! (The loud noise of you completely missing the point of my
    post.)

    Let's start again. A complete list of "atomic facts", were such
    possible, would tell you NOTHING about what can be expressed in language.
    Your favourite nonsense quote about green thoughts sleeping furiously is
    just as expressible as "Olcott is intelligent" or "the halting problem is solvable". Expressibility has no connection with truth or falsehood or provability.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott
    --
    Alan Mackenzie (Nuremberg, Germany).

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:10:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect. >>>>
    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.

    It tells us exactly one thing.

    Which thing? If the meanings of the words are already known it does
    not tell anything that is not obvious from those meanings.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 13:13:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:24, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 18:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called
    an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    For some kind of formal semantics where the meaning of a fintite
    string is another finite string (or perhaps, in some cases, the
    same). That way does not get any real world semantics, though
    it can extend real world semantics if you already have some.

    All of meaning expressed in language works this same way.

    There is nore meaning expessed in language than you seem to be aware of.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.

    They come from experiences about uses of those words by other people.
    Likewise for most of commonly used words and phrases.

    If this was true then Chinese would not exist.

    There is no reason to think so. In particular, that cannot be inferred
    from what is known to be true.

    Stipulated relations between finite strings is
    the only way that language acquires meaning.

    The "only" above is not supported by anything we know. It is not
    even possible to stipulate anything before at least several words
    already have meanings.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 08:51:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 2:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily incorrect. >>>>>
    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat"
    or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.

    It tells us exactly one thing.

    Which thing? If the meanings of the words are already known it does
    not tell anything that is not obvious from those meanings.


    "cats" ⊂ "animals"
    "animals" ⊃ "cats"
    Is to be construed as the first time that anyone
    has every seen those finite strings.

    We are defining the English meaning of words
    to a computer program that starts as a completely
    blank slate.

    The end result of defining every "atomic fact"
    of empirical general knowledge is that the computer
    has complete general knowledge of the world.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:51:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 5:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:24, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 18:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called >>>>>>> an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the
    sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world
    when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence
    of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    For some kind of formal semantics where the meaning of a fintite
    string is another finite string (or perhaps, in some cases, the
    same). That way does not get any real world semantics, though
    it can extend real world semantics if you already have some.

    All of meaning expressed in language works this same way.

    There is nore meaning expessed in language than you seem to be aware of.


    I don't want to keep repeating all the details
    that prove this hundreds and hundreds of times.
    If you cannot remember what I already told you 20
    times then you are too disrespectful.

    Try to find some other way that "cats" <are> "animals"
    can acquire semantic meaning besides Davidson Semantics.

    They come from experiences about uses of those words by other people.
    Likewise for most of commonly used words and phrases.

    If this was true then Chinese would not exist.

    There is no reason to think so. In particular, that cannot be inferred
    from what is known to be true.

    Stipulated relations between finite strings is
    the only way that language acquires meaning.

    The "only" above is not supported by anything we know. It is not
    even possible to stipulate anything before at least several words
    already have meanings.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 10:29:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 20:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 5:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:24, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 18:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    That depends on the semantic system. Often the meaning of the word >>>>>>>> "cat" indeed involves that what is called a "cat" is also called >>>>>>>> an "animal" but there are other posiibilities. Conseqently, the >>>>>>>> sentence "cats are animals" can be a semantic tautology that tells >>>>>>>> nothing about the real world,

    It tells us exactly one thing about the real world 1 != 0

    A tautology tells nothing about the real world. Sometimes one can
    have a false impression that something is said about the real world >>>>>> when a tautology is presented. But that impression is a consequence >>>>>> of insufficient or invalid consideration of logic and semantics.

    Stipulative definition of relations between finite
    strings is the only way that these finite strings
    acquire semantic meaning.

    For some kind of formal semantics where the meaning of a fintite
    string is another finite string (or perhaps, in some cases, the
    same). That way does not get any real world semantics, though
    it can extend real world semantics if you already have some.

    All of meaning expressed in language works this same way.

    There is nore meaning expessed in language than you seem to be aware of.

    I don't want to keep repeating all the details
    that prove this hundreds and hundreds of times.
    If you cannot remember what I already told you 20
    times then you are too disrespectful.

    You have never proven the absense of any other meaning expressed
    in language.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 10:35:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 16:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily
    incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat" >>>>>> or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you
    have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.

    It tells us exactly one thing.

    Which thing? If the meanings of the words are already known it does
    not tell anything that is not obvious from those meanings.

    "cats" ⊂ "animals"
    "animals" ⊃ "cats"
    Is to be construed as the first time that anyone
    has every seen those finite strings.

    We are defining the English meaning of words
    to a computer program that starts as a completely
    blank slate.

    The end result of defining every "atomic fact"
    of empirical general knowledge is that the computer
    has complete general knowledge of the world.
    The computer does not know that there is a real world.
    It just does wbat it is made to do.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 22:12:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 16:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily
    incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat" >>>>>>> or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you >>>>>>> have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that
    "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting
    about the real world.

    It tells us exactly one thing.

    Which thing? If the meanings of the words are already known it does
    not tell anything that is not obvious from those meanings.

    "cats" ⊂ "animals"
    "animals" ⊃ "cats"
    Is to be construed as the first time that anyone
    has every seen those finite strings.

    We are defining the English meaning of words
    to a computer program that starts as a completely
    blank slate.

    The end result of defining every "atomic fact"
    of empirical general knowledge is that the computer
    has complete general knowledge of the world.
    The computer does not know that there is a real world.
    It just does wbat it is made to do.


    As I have said many many dozens of times we encode
    all of the "basic facts" of general knowledge both
    empirical (the facts of the actual world) and analytical
    knowledge into a finite set of axioms.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 10:51:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 2:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 16:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 19:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
    Cats are animals, if you disagree then you are necessarily
    incorrect.

    You may use "cats are animals" as a part of the defintion of "cat" >>>>>>>> or of the definition of "animal" but not both. However, above you >>>>>>>> have done neither, so you haven't excluded the possibility that >>>>>>>> "cats are animals" is a statement about the real world.

    cats ⊂ animals
    animals ⊃ cats
    They prove each other, thus only one of them is
    an atomic fact. Atomic facts are facts that cannot
    be derived from other facts.

    In my actual system cats would inherit from animals
    in the knowledge ontology / simple type hierarchy.

    In that case the sentence "cats are animals" does not tell anyting >>>>>> about the real world.

    It tells us exactly one thing.

    Which thing? If the meanings of the words are already known it does
    not tell anything that is not obvious from those meanings.

    "cats" ⊂ "animals"
    "animals" ⊃ "cats"
    Is to be construed as the first time that anyone
    has every seen those finite strings.

    We are defining the English meaning of words
    to a computer program that starts as a completely
    blank slate.

    The end result of defining every "atomic fact"
    of empirical general knowledge is that the computer
    has complete general knowledge of the world.
    The computer does not know that there is a real world.
    It just does wbat it is made to do.

    As I have said many many dozens of times we encode
    all of the "basic facts" of general knowledge both
    empirical (the facts of the actual world) and analytical
    knowledge into a finite set of axioms.

    A computer can process those axioms as programmed but it cannot
    relate them to the real world because it is not aware of the
    real world.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic on Thu Jul 9 10:55:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 22/06/2026 17:44, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 21/06/2026 23:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean you're
    capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 incompleteness >>>>> fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or understanding of the >>>> truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS somehow causes >>>> Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert who'll have >>>> some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not understand. >>>>
    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you certainly don't >>>> understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor any proof of >>>> it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's completeness and incompleteness
    theorems are inevitable consequences of Peano arithmetic.

    Within the foundation of Truth Conditional Semantics
    this is true. Within the foundation of strict Proof
    Theoretic Semantics this is false.

    No, it is not false because the opposite is not provable.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jul 11 22:52:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 6/20/2026 10:34 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/20/2026 5:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote:
    On 19/06/2026 23:28, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:
    On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
    https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
    Making sure to leave out

    Proof-theoretic semantics
    (an alternative to truth-condition semantics)
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/

    Some people only memorize conventional views and
    reject alternative views out-of-hand without review.

    Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and reject
    alternative views out-of-hand without review.


    Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics)
    incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to
    look into proof theoretic semantics.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/

    I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page. It is abstract in >>>>> the extreme. One thing is utterly clear: its level of abstraction is >>>>> well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter Olcott, who can't >>>>> even understand proof by contradiction.

    That page's level of abstraction is high enough that I can't be bothered >>>>> to read it any further. If it actually says anything at all, that
    something is heavily disguised. From it's "Conclusion and Outlook"
    section at the end:

    | Standard proof-theoretic semantics has practically exclusively been >>>>> | occupied with logical constants. Logical constants play a central role >>>>> | in reasoning and inference, but are definitely not the exclusive, and >>>>> | perhaps not even the most typical sort of entities that can be defined >>>>> | inferentially. A framework is needed that deals with inferential
    | definitions in a wider sense and covers both logical and extra-logical >>>>> | inferential definitions alike.

    Does this have any meaning?

    Yes. It means that proof-theoretic semantics is currently and in the
    near future not useful as making it useful requires much time and
    effort if it is possible at all.

    Do its proponents have any idea what PTS ought to be useful for? What it

    It makes "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    Taking a best guess at what that phrase is meant to mean, it doesn't. Or
    at the very least, you have failed to meet your burden of proof that it
    does.


    When the entire body of general knowledge expressed in
    language is a finite list of atomic facts and relations
    between these facts then truth becomes computable by
    lookup table for this entire body.

    We know that in any sufficiently powerful language (and the bar is not
    high), there are statements which are "incomputable". If you doubt this,
    and still believe PTS gives a different result, please show some
    mathematical proof which comes out differently between standard logic and PTS, illustrating the essence of PTS which makes it so.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2