• Re: The simple essence of Proof Theoretic Semantics

    From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:36:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy
    (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value
    of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>> when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
    the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    The counter-example algorithm D is this:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }



    is more like
    the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)

    If it is true that makes it false.
    If it is false that make is true.
    Therefore is has always been fucking nonsense.

    That it took humans more than five minutes to
    see this conclusively proves how stupid they are.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 21:53:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for
    something to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>> when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>> is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
    It has always been fucking nuts to require a machine
    to report on the behavior of another machine that
    does the opposite of whatever it reports.

    Are you too fucking stupid to see this?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:00:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
    system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q that >>>> have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
    the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:17:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
    system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>> using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q
    that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
    the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
        ptr *X = D;
        ptr *Y = I;
        int result;
        {
            result = 0;
        }
        if (result == 1) {
            while (1);
        }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
        int result;
        {
            result = 0;
        }
        return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:18:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott
    2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>>> using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q
    that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>> the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>> directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:29:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott
    2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>>> the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>>> directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D); // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
    Are you a complete jackass?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:34:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
    system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:43:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
    system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:59:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 00:01:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
    the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:03:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of >>>>>>>>>>> the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
    the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:55:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:57:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was
    algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>> the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:49:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.


    Is (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    One cannot properly study math and logic without
    looking at them through computation because
    computation requires things that math and logic
    incorrectly assume away.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:51:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was
    algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>>> the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 12:04:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider, and another algorithm built by the template that the first one answers wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 11:52:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    I will not respond to any of your future posts that
    are very stupid. Say something smart or you will be
    ignored from now on.

    and another algorithm built by the template that the first one
    answers wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 12:55:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I will not respond to any of your future posts that
    are very stupid. Say something smart or you will be
    ignored from now on.

    and another algorithm built by the template that the first one answers
    wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 13:13:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable
    and you act like this is a fucking joke to be
    trolled.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 14:22:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>>

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.

    and you act like this is a fucking joke to be
    trolled.

    That you don't understand my explanations for why you're wrong doesn't
    mean I'm trolling.

    It is amusing however how you claim to be working so hard against liars
    when you've demonstrated yourself to be as much of a liar if not more
    that the people you say you're fighting against.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 14:33:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
    everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 15:52:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>
    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
    everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth preserving operations starting with the precondition that a contradiction has been
    proven true in the system in question.

    You agreed with this when you dishonestly dodged the question (on
    multiple occasions) of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 15:53:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.

    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because
    algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>> decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm
    D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:54:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>>> decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm >>>>>> D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
    operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    On 6/28/2026 11:56 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:53 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 8:42 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 8:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    Given that the following natural language statement is true:

    --------------------------------------
    Earth is the third planet from the sun.
    --------------------------------------

    In the following natural language statement:

    --------------------------------------
    At least one of the following statements is true:
    - Earth is the third planet from the sun.
    - <X>
    --------------------------------------

    Given that <X> is any *truth bearing* natural language statement,
    does there exist a statement X such that the condition "At least one
    of the following statements is true" is false?


    Head games will be ignored.


    Explain in detail how this is a head game.

    Failure to either answer the above question or explain how it is a
    head game in your next reply or within one hour of you next post in
    this newsgroup will be taken as your official, on-the-record admission
    that Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid,
    and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.


    Let the record show that Peter Olcott made the following post in this newsgroup:

    On 6/28/2026 10:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do.
    ...

    And more that one hour has passed with no attempt to answer the above question or explain why it is a head game. Therefore, as per the above criteria:

    Let The Record Show

    That Peter Olcott

    Has *Officially* Admitted:

    That Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid, and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:12:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
    operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    proves that at least one of the two sentences is false.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:23:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.

    From *there*, the principle of explosion is applied, demonstrating that
    the system that proved the contradiction is useless.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:40:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    The conclusion that most all logicians are despicable liars
    seems implausible so what is left? INDOCTRINATION !!!

    From *there*, the principle of explosion is applied, demonstrating that
    the system that proved the contradiction is useless.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:59:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.

    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and
    others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
    proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.



    The conclusion that most all logicians are despicable liars
    seems implausible so what is left?

    Simple. You're not smart enough to understand high school level logic,
    which you've demonstrated on countless occasions.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:13:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
    proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:32:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
    are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both X
    and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that system
    is useless.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:35:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ⊢ X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's
    correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>> (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
    are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of explosion
    can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both X
    and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that system
    is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:47:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example.  I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ
    ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.  So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.

    False.  It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>          while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>>> (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a >>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>> are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of explosion >>>> can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
    X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
    system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system, further truth preserving operations leads to the principle of explosion.

    That it appears counterintuitive does not mean it is incorrect. You
    were challenged to find a step that was not truth preserving and you
    were unable to do so.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:53:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ
    ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *only* an infinite connection to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>          while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if a >>>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>>> are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>

    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
    X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
    system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction
    such that a pair of sentences X and Y cannot possibly both
    be true...
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:59:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ
    ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>          while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if >>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both
    statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>>

    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
    that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system. It
    is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R does
    not contain itself". So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set theory. The principle of explosion can then be used to show that naive set theory is useless.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:49:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 5:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      ptr *Y = I; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>          while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {
         int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      {
             result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>      }
         return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }


    That is just nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.  The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively >>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q  is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And if >>>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both >>>>>>>>> statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>
    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
    useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
    that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system, >>
    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system.  It
    is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R does
    not contain itself".  So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set theory.  The principle of explosion can then be used to show that naive set theory is useless.

    Russell's Paradox is the exact same issue as the
    pathological self reference (PSR) of the Halting
    Problem. I have studied PSR as a primary focus
    for 28 years.

    Why is it so hard for people to see that PSR is
    the same issue that ZFC eliminated?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 20:03:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/2/2026 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.  And >>>>>>>>>> if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series >>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means >>>>>>>>>> both statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>>
    Your intuition fails you.  It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent.  And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
    useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show >>>>>> that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal
    system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system.
    It is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R
    does not contain itself".  So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set
    theory.  The principle of explosion can then be used to show that
    naive set theory is useless.

    Russell's Paradox is the exact same issue as the
    pathological self reference (PSR) of the Halting
    Problem. I have studied PSR as a primary focus
    for 28 years.

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as algorithms
    can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 00:02:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
    the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool
    (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.c on Fri Jul 3 12:22:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.  I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a truth value.

    André


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.  So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.  It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);   // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 12:28:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither. It is true about natural numbers but there
    are other models of Rbinsons Q, and it is false in some of them.
    A simple example is a model that incudes all natural numbers and
    one additional element that is its own successor.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 08:45:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
    the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your phrasing'
    refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're still
    talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.

    And there isn't an infinite sequence of steps that will get you from the axioms of Q to ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x. There's *no* sequence of steps, finite or infinite.

    The issue here is that there are models of Q in which ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is true, but there are also models of Q in which it is false.

    For any given model of Q, it will either be true or false, so your claim
    that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is somehow 'not a truth bearer' is simply ludicrous. It's simply the case that this particular statement cannot be derived as
    a theorem of Q nor can its negation. Thus Q is incomplete.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 10:36:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.
    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 10:38:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    It is true about natural numbers but there
    are other models of Rbinsons Q, and it is false in some of them.
    A simple example is a model that incudes all natural numbers and
    one additional element that is its own successor.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 11:50:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.

    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider.

    C function D doesn't need to call C function H. Algorithm D used
    algorithm H as part of it, meaning algorithm D used the template to
    cause algorithm H to get the wrong answer for it.

    He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.


    It was a logical grouping so you can see how algorithm H is part of
    algorithm D.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 11:48:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
    the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool
    (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim, the
    universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're still
    talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
    Are the universally quantified claims that can be proven like
    this one (∀x, x = x) ?

    And there isn't an infinite sequence of steps that will get you from the axioms of Q to ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x. There's *no* sequence of steps, finite or infinite.


    So trying every element of the set of natural numbers
    would not derive the truth value after am infinite
    number of steps (that never complete)?

    The issue here is that there are models of Q

    Which do not exist in PTS thus are off topic in this thread.
    All of the rest is off-topic in this thread.

    in which ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is
    true, but there are also models of Q in which it is false.

    For any given model of Q, it will either be true or false, so your claim that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is somehow 'not a truth bearer' is simply ludicrous. It's simply the case that this particular statement cannot be derived as
    a theorem of Q nor can its negation. Thus Q is incomplete.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 11:52:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider.

    C function D doesn't need to call C function H.

    You said that it was an example of the HP counter-example input.
    That was counter-factual. If you keep making these "mistakes"
    I will quit looking at anything that you say. Your insight
    into Q seems to prove that these "mistakes" are intentional.

    Maybe you are good at math and totally clueless about programming?

    Algorithm D used
    algorithm H as part of it, meaning algorithm D used the template to
    cause algorithm H to get the wrong answer for it.

    He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.


    It was a logical grouping so you can see how algorithm H is part of algorithm D.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 13:10:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Yes?

    Then it meets the prerequisites to be a halt decider. If you disagree, explain in detail why.


    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider.

    C function D doesn't need to call C function H.

    You said that it was an example of the HP counter-example input.

    Yes, because algorithm D was built by the counter-example template to
    make algorithm H get the wrong answer.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why the above is wrong.

    That was counter-factual. If you keep making these "mistakes"
    I will quit looking at anything that you say. Your insight
    into Q seems to prove that these "mistakes" are intentional.

    I assure you there is no mistake or "mistake". You just don't yet
    understand the point I'm making.


    Maybe you are good at math and totally clueless about programming?

    Algorithm D used algorithm H as part of it, meaning algorithm D used
    the template to cause algorithm H to get the wrong answer for it.

    He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.


    It was a logical grouping so you can see how algorithm H is part of
    algorithm D.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 11:17:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
    the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool
    (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim,
    the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're
    still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q, so there would be a serious
    problem with Q if it could prove this.

    Are the universally quantified claims that can be proven like
    this one (∀x, x = x) ?

    That and many others. I have no idea what you mean by 'like this one'.
    It can prove many things involving universal quantifiers.

    And there isn't an infinite sequence of steps that will get you from
    the axioms of Q to ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x. There's *no* sequence of steps,
    finite or infinite.


    So trying every element of the set of natural numbers
    would not derive the truth value after am infinite
    number of steps (that never complete)?

    Trying every element of the set of natural numbers would depend on a
    model of Q which instantiates the natural numbers. There are models of Q
    which do not.

    The issue here is that there are models of Q

    Which do not exist in PTS thus are off topic in this thread.
    All of the rest is off-topic in this thread.

    Q *requires* a model. It isn't meaningful without one. You are terribly confused about PTS. PTS does not reject models. It just doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics since it is only concerned with proof and not
    truth. Models will often define what is and isn't true but won't define
    which propositions are derivable purely from from the axioms of the
    system which is what PTS is concerned with

    When we say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is not provable in Q, we are effectively saying that it cannot be shown to hold for all possible models of Q
    solely from the axioms of Q.

    But crucially (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is *always* a truth bearer for every model
    of Q.

    in which ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is true, but there are also models of Q in
    which it is false.

    For any given model of Q, it will either be true or false, so your
    claim that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is somehow 'not a truth bearer' is simply
    ludicrous. It's simply the case that this particular statement cannot
    be derived as a theorem of Q nor can its negation. Thus Q is incomplete.

    André



    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 11:35:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in >>>>>>>>>>>> the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 13:10:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 13:12:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to
    get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool >>>> (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim,
    the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're
    still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off. >>>
    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:18:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping. Nowhere is there a requirement for the
    implementation to "do" anything with the input.

    But since it doesn't matter for the point, if it makes you happy let's
    instead use the below algorithm H1 as a potential halt decider and
    algorithm D1 which is designed via the counter-example template to make algorithm H1 get the wrong answer.

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D1; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    return result;
    }

    There, now the input is not ignored.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 13:20:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>
    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?


    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec. terms of the art
    are often misleading, thus deceptive.

    When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
    empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
    the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
    then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
    entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
    not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
    in language.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 12:21:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
    sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to
    get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the
    tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite
    claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
    we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is
    simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored explained
    *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models or model
    theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics. Q
    *requires* a model.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:27:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
    there is nothing to ignore. What an algorithm might do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    Here's a simpler example. Consider the following mapping, with the
    domain being integers from 0 to 255:

    input | output
    --------------
    0 | 4
    1 | 4
    2 | 4
    3 | 4
    ...
    253 | 4
    254 | 4
    255 | 4

    i.e. for all inputs in the domain, output 4.

    Requirement: an algorithm that computes the above mapping.

    The following algorithm meets this requirement:

    int foo(unsigned char x)
    {
    return 4;
    }


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 13:36:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    // Greater_Than_Five function
    int Transform(int X)
    {
    if (X > 5)
    return 1;
    return 0;
    }

    int Do_Not_Transform(int X)
    {
    return 0;
    }
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 12:37:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?


    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It certainly
    does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.

    terms of the art
    are often misleading, thus deceptive.

    Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so there
    is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
    misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
    misleading since they are often not precisely defined.

    When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
    empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
    the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
    then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
    entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
    not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
    in language.

    Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or
    otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none of
    this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 13:38:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite
    claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
    we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
    particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models or model
    theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics. Q
    *requires* a model.

    André


    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:40:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 2:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.

    There is nothing incoherent about that. But if it makes you happy let's instead use the below algorithm H1 as a potential halt decider and
    algorithm D1 which is designed via the counter-example template to make algorithm H1 get the wrong answer.

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D1; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    return result;
    }

    There, now the input is not ignored.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 13:45:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
    return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    My HHH applies the operational semantics of
    C to its finite string input DD to correctly
    determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
    well-founded justification tree within these
    operational semantics.

    With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
    would be correct.

    int HHH(ptr DD)
    {
    if (5 > 3)
    return 0;
    }

    My system pays attention to how true on the basis
    of meaning expressed in language is actually computed.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 12:46:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite >>>>>>> claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
    we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>> particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
    Q *requires* a model.

    André


    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    Which has no bearing on the existence of models or on the fact that Q
    requires a model. When we assert that something is provable from the
    axioms of Q, we are effectively saying that it is true in all models of Q.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 12:47:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:53:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
      return 0;
    }

    The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:

    input | output
    ------------------
    (any int) | 0


    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    My HHH applies the operational semantics of
    C to its finite string input DD to correctly
    determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
    well-founded justification tree within these
    operational semantics.

    With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
    would be correct.

    int HHH(ptr DD)
    {
      if (5 > 3)
       return 0;
    }

    The above partial halt decider meets the below requirements for all
    algorithms that do not halt:


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:08:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
    there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.


    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.
    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 15:12:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 3:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
    there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to *compute*
    the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.


    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.
    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.


    Here's a simpler example. Consider the following mapping, with the
    domain being integers from 0 to 255:

    input | output
    --------------
    0 | 4
    1 | 4
    2 | 4
    3 | 4
    ...
    253 | 4
    254 | 4
    255 | 4

    i.e. for all inputs in the domain, output 4.

    Requirement: an algorithm that computes the above mapping.

    The following algorithm meets this requirement:

    int foo(unsigned char x)
    {
    return 4;
    }


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 15:13:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?


    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It certainly
    does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.


    An motor vehicle that is missing a motor is incomplete.
    A bicycle that is missing a motor is NOT incomplete.

    Incomplete is an adjective that describes something
    missing essential parts, lacking necessary details,
    or left unfinished.

    terms of the art
    are often misleading, thus deceptive.

    Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so there
    is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
    misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
    misleading since they are often not precisely defined.


    These TOTA that diverge from their base meanings confuse
    people into thinking that computation is limited. The
    inability to correctly compute the numerical square-root
    of a dead chicken does not make computation incomplete
    or limited.

    When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
    empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
    the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
    then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
    entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
    not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
    in language.

    Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none of
    this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.

    André


    It has the "atomic facts" of Q.
    Any expression that cannot reach these "atomic fact"
    axioms is ungrounded in the atomic base of Q.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 14:32:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 14:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?


    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It certainly
    does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.


    An motor vehicle that is missing a motor is incomplete.
    A bicycle that is missing a motor is NOT incomplete.

    Incomplete is an adjective that describes something
    missing essential parts, lacking necessary details,
    or left unfinished.

    That's *one* definition of incomplete. It's hardly *the* definition and
    you have provided no reason to think that it is the 'base definition'
    whatever that might mean to you.

    terms of the art
    are often misleading, thus deceptive.

    Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so
    there is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
    misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
    misleading since they are often not precisely defined.


    These TOTA that diverge from their base meanings confuse
    people into thinking that computation is limited.

    No. It confuses *you*. The vast majority of people are not confused by
    this. And stating that Q is incomplete has nothing to do with
    computation. Computation is a separate field.

    André

    The
    inability to correctly compute the numerical square-root
    of a dead chicken does not make computation incomplete
    or limited.

    When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
    empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
    the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
    then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
    entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
    not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
    in language.

    Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or
    otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none of
    this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.

    André


    It has the "atomic facts" of Q.
    Any expression that cannot reach these "atomic fact"
    axioms is ungrounded in the atomic base of Q.

    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 15:35:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:53 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
    an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:

    input     | output
    ------------------
    (any int) | 0


    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    My HHH applies the operational semantics of
    C to its finite string input DD to correctly
    determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
    well-founded justification tree within these
    operational semantics.

    With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
    would be correct.

    int HHH(ptr DD)
    {
       if (5 > 3)
        return 0;
    }


    Because it ignores the input it is not any halt
    function at all.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 15:43:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:46 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a
    finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement
    remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>>> particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
    Q *requires* a model.

    André


    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    Which has no bearing on the existence of models

    Proof theoretic semantics is utterly unconcerned with true
    in a model and focuses on the existence of a canonical proof.

    You are exactly right. You have captured the absolute core distinction
    between modern semantic frameworks. Proof-theoretic semantics completely rejects the traditional Tarskian view that meaning is rooted in truth conditions or reference to an external model. Instead, it builds on
    Michael Dummett’s and Dag Prawitz’s insight that meaning is determined
    by the rules of use, specifically how a proposition can be verified or
    proven


    or on the fact that Q
    requires a model. When we assert that something is provable from the
    axioms of Q, we are effectively saying that it is true in all models of Q.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 16:59:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 4:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:53 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:

    input     | output
    ------------------
    (any int) | 0


    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    My HHH applies the operational semantics of
    C to its finite string input DD to correctly
    determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
    well-founded justification tree within these
    operational semantics.

    With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
    would be correct.

    int HHH(ptr DD)
    {
       if (5 > 3)
        return 0;
    }


    Because it ignores the input it is not any halt
    function at all.

    False, as proven by the below which you dishonestly erased.

    The above partial halt decider meets the below requirements for all
    algorithms that do not halt:


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X
    described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 15:22:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 14:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:46 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not
    that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
    semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    André


    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    Which has no bearing on the existence of models

    Proof theoretic semantics is utterly unconcerned  with true
    in a model and focuses on the existence of a canonical proof.

    PTS isn't concerned with true at all, which is why it certainly wouldn't
    claim that a proposition which can neither be proven nor not proven is
    not a 'truth bearer'. However, you have made this claim about (∀x, S(x)
    ≠ x) in Q despite the fact that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is *always* either true or false. It cannot be derived as as theorem, but it is still most
    decidedly a truth-bearer.

    Once you start making claims about things being truth-bhearers/non truth-bearers, you're firmly dealing with a semantics that concerns
    itself with truth, i.e. not PTS.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 17:37:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 16:51:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 20:10:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.


    It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
    any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly reports
    the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.

    If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below requirements
    is violated in doing so. If you dishonestly trim this, it will be taken
    as your official, on-the-record admission that the below requirements
    are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that halt when executed directly.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 20:11:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 8:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.


    It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
    any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly reports
    the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.

    Correction: it correctly reports the halt status of any algorithm that
    *does not* halt when executed directly.


    If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below requirements
    is violated in doing so.  If you dishonestly trim this, it will be taken
    as your official, on-the-record admission that the below requirements
    are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that halt when executed
    directly.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 20:08:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 3:32 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 14:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?


    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It
    certainly does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.


    An motor vehicle that is missing a motor is incomplete.
    A bicycle that is missing a motor is NOT incomplete.

    Incomplete is an adjective that describes something
    missing essential parts, lacking necessary details,
    or left unfinished.

    That's *one* definition of incomplete. It's hardly *the* definition and
    you have provided no reason to think that it is the 'base definition' whatever that might mean to you.


    The parent node of an inheritance hierarchy.

    terms of the art
    are often misleading, thus deceptive.

    Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so
    there is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
    misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
    misleading since they are often not precisely defined.


    These TOTA that diverge from their base meanings confuse
    people into thinking that computation is limited.

    No. It confuses *you*. The vast majority of people are not confused by
    this. And stating that Q is incomplete has nothing to do with
    computation. Computation is a separate field.


    It is a shade of a nuance of the same reasoning that
    incorrectly determines that computation is limited.

    Computation is in its most basic essence applying
    finite string transformations to inputs to derive
    outputs.

    Anything that cannot be so computed is out-of-scope
    of computation is the same way that a Turing machine
    cannot bake a birthday cake.

    André

    The
    inability to correctly compute the numerical square-root
    of a dead chicken does not make computation incomplete
    or limited.

    When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
    empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
    the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
    then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
    entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
    not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
    in language.

    Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or
    otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none
    of this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.

    André


    It has the "atomic facts" of Q.
    Any expression that cannot reach these "atomic fact"
    axioms is ungrounded in the atomic base of Q.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jul 3 20:11:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 4:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 14:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:46 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>> that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject
    models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
    semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    André


    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    Which has no bearing on the existence of models

    Proof theoretic semantics is utterly unconcerned  with true
    in a model and focuses on the existence of a canonical proof.

    PTS isn't concerned with true at all,


    Truth as an Epistemic Notion https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6
    That is Proof Theoretic Semantics being concerned with truth.

    which is why it certainly wouldn't
    claim that a proposition which can neither be proven nor not proven is
    not a 'truth bearer'. However, you have made this claim about (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) in Q despite the fact that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is *always* either true or false. It cannot be derived as as theorem, but it is still most
    decidedly a truth-bearer.

    Once you start making claims about things being truth-bhearers/non truth-bearers, you're firmly dealing with a semantics that concerns
    itself with truth, i.e. not PTS.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 20:52:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 21:58:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 21:02:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 7:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.


    It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
    any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly reports
    the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.

    If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below requirements
    is violated in doing so.  If you dishonestly trim this, it will be taken
    as your official, on-the-record admission that the below requirements
    are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that halt when executed
    directly.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly


    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 21:05:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>>> definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
    and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely so that
    you cannot just "assume away" details then your notion
    requires a halt decider to report on the behavior of
    its caller having no idea who its caller is.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 22:18:03 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 10:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 7:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.


    It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
    any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly
    reports the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.

    If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below
    requirements is violated in doing so.  If you dishonestly trim this,
    it will be taken as your official, on-the-record admission that the
    below requirements are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that
    halt when executed directly.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    A actual halt function must compute the mapping
    Shown above.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 22:19:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
    and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    so that
    you cannot just "assume away" details then your notion
    requires a halt decider to report on the behavior of
    its caller having no idea who its caller is.


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly




    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 21:37:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.


    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jul 3 22:43:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/3/2026 10:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.


    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.


    Nope. Requirements are requirements for a reason. If they can't be satisfied, then that's just the way it is.

    I would like to have a single algorithm that can tell me whether any
    arbitrary algorithm with a given input will halt when executed directly,
    but unfortunately no such algorithm exists.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:37:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
    algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.

    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
    or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
    although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.

    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.

    His use of {} is perfectly correct by C rules and as meaningful ans
    usually. Your false claim (not shown above) is false.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:41:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:43:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.

    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.

    Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
    is not.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:46:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
    an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:48:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:55:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
      return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 10:57:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 23:35, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:53 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:

    input     | output
    ------------------
    (any int) | 0


    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    My HHH applies the operational semantics of
    C to its finite string input DD to correctly
    determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
    well-founded justification tree within these
    operational semantics.

    With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
    would be correct.

    int HHH(ptr DD)
    {
       if (5 > 3)
        return 0;
    }


    Because it ignores the input it is not any halt
    function at all.

    So even though you reject the logic you agree with the conclusion.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:00:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
    there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to *compute*
    the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:04:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 18:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in >>>>>>>>>>>> the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    You don't need any PTS to see that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q. That everything is semantically undefined in Q is
    sufficient to determine that so is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x).
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:06:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>
    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>> and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 11:49:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite >>>>>>> claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
    we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>> particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
    Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 08:32:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
    algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         // algorithm D; input: I
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }

    On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.

    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
    or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
    although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.


    counter-factual H always returns 0.

    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.

    His use of {} is perfectly correct by C rules and as meaningful ans
    usually. Your false claim (not shown above) is false.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 09:37:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
    algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         // algorithm D; input: I
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }

    On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.

    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
    or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
    although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.


    counter-factual H always returns 0.

    Which means the condition "either 0 or 1" is satisfied.

    It seems we need to add "or" to the list of basic high school level
    logic topics you don't understand.


    His input merely halted and did not call
    this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
    made no sense in C.

    His use of {} is perfectly correct by C rules and as meaningful ans
    usually. Your false claim (not shown above) is false.




    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 08:38:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.


    Making it complete nonsense.

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03 int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04 if (Halt_Status)
    05 HERE: goto HERE;
    06 return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11 DD();
    12 HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 09:40:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 9:38 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.


    Making it complete nonsense.

    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 16:31:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list. When it's applied to a list that doesn't have a construction then the result isn't a construction of a diagonal number.

    If we take a list of any infinite sequences to admit those that have no construction then our diagonal number is not constructed.

    If, instead of restricted universal quantification (∀ st.) which ranges
    over the constructible objects with a restriction, we use restricted fantastical quantification (🦄 st.) then we will range over lists that
    are not constructible unless the restriction excludes them, thus we
    could range over lists containing numbers that are not constructible,
    then our diagonal number is not constructed in each case.

    Where we are challenged to give a list, we ought to be challenged to
    construct a list.

    (Namely, we don't need to say "assume ab abdsurdo that
    an enumeration is given", we can just say "for *any* list,
    we *construct* an element not in the list".)

    For any constructible list.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:52:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
    an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.

    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.

    Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
    is not.


    The output really should be based on the input
    because computing the mapping from an input to
    an output requires some kind of correspondence
    between the two.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 11:55:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>>> definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
    and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.


    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03 int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04 if (Halt_Status)
    05 HERE: goto HERE;
    06 return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11 DD();
    12 HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 11:58:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
    mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".


    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    The halting problem requires a decider that correctly
    reports the halt status of an input that does the opposite
    of whatever it reports. The meaning of these words prove
    that is logically impossible.

    I already established that an incorrect polar question
    is any yes/no question lacking a correct yes/no answer.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 12:01:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
    an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.


    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 12:03:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
    an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to
    *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.


    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Sat Jul 4 13:04:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.

    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.

    Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
    is not.


    The output really should be based on the input
    because computing the mapping from an input to
    an output requires some kind of correspondence
    between the two.


    Given this correspondence:

    input | output
    --------------
    0 | 4
    1 | 4
    2 | 4
    3 | 4
    ...
    253 | 4
    254 | 4
    255 | 4

    i.e. for all inputs in the domain, output 4.

    Requirement: an algorithm that computes the above mapping.

    The following algorithm meets this requirement:

    int foo(unsigned char x)
    {
    return 4;
    }
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 12:07:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>>
    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>>> and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.
    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 13:07:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 12:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
    mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".


    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    The halting problem requires a decider that correctly
    reports the halt status of an input that does the opposite
    of whatever it reports.

    For example, algorithm H1 and algorithm D1 below:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D1; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H1; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0 + (X-X) + (Y-Y);
    }
    return result;
    }


    I already established that an incorrect polar question
    is any yes/no question lacking a correct yes/no answer.


    And the question "does algorithm X with input Y halt when executed
    directly for any algorithm X and input Y" is not such a question, as it
    does have a correct yes/no question in all cases.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 13:10:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 1:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.


    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    The mathematical mapping *is* the correspondence. For example:

    input | output
    --------------
    0 | 4
    1 | 4
    2 | 4
    3 | 4
    ...
    253 | 4
    254 | 4
    255 | 4

    i.e. for all inputs in the domain, output 4.

    Requirement: an algorithm that computes the above mapping.

    The following algorithm meets this requirement:

    int foo(unsigned char x)
    {
    return 4;
    }


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 13:11:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to >>>>>>>>>>> do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>>>
    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>>>> and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.


    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.
    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 12:13:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.

    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a
    finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement
    remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
    phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>>> particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?

    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
    Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.


    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 16:01:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes >>>>>>>>>>>> PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still
    incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.


    These definitions are the liars.
    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog


    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.
    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 16:12:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
    G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.
    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
    return 0;
    }
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sat Jul 4 17:30:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
      return 0;
    }



    Given the following mathematical mapping:

    input | output
    --------------
    0 | 4
    1 | 4
    2 | 4
    3 | 4
    ...
    253 | 4
    254 | 4
    255 | 4

    And the requirement for an algorithm that can compute this mapping,

    Does following algorithm meet this requirement?

    int foo(unsigned char x)
    {
    return 4;
    }

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 14:59:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 22:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)


    Is it right to call that "incoherent"?

    "incoherent" would seem to me to be reservable for a purported
    demonstration of a deduction which is constructed of two deductions that
    do not validly lead from one to the other.

    "valueless" is accurate, technically, but it has an ordinary economic
    sense similar to "worthless".

    "non-normalisable" is accurate and, more usefully, so is "non-head-normalisable" (and some other related terms).

    "loopy" might be useful but readers would probably go insane at you
    because they go insane at much less.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 10:19:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct
    yes-or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False. Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for
    every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or
    its negation is provable

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory

    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.

    Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
    2) forbids it.

    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
      return 0;
    }




    All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have
    different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 15:52:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 11:23:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 8:59 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 22:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)


    Is it right to call that "incoherent"?

    "incoherent" would seem to me to be reservable for a purported
    demonstration of a deduction which is constructed of two deductions that
    do not validly lead from one to the other.

    "valueless" is accurate, technically, but it has an ordinary economic
    sense similar to "worthless".

    "non-normalisable" is accurate and, more usefully, so is

    That is one of the proof theoretic semantics way of
    saying it. There are many other PTS ways of saying it.

    "non-head-normalisable" (and some other related terms).

    "loopy" might be useful but readers would probably go insane at you
    because they go insane at much less.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 11:29:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or
    its negation is provable


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    Ultimately the above is true and one key PTS author
    comes very close to agreeing with that.

    *Truth as an Epistemic Notion*
    What is the appropriate notion of truth for
    sentences whose meanings are understood in
    epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
    an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
    sentences has to be identified with the existence
    of proofs...

    https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory

    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.

    Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
    2) forbids it.

    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }




    All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 17:31:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 15:52, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.


    Oooh! Oooh! Except for inner dequantification of a statement of multiple fantastic quantification! That might have quantification elimination
    rules, perhaps!

    I'm loving this game!
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 11:33:23 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔ 01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬ 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 12:39:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 12:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be
    impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct
    yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.

    Your lack of response is acceptance of the above definition.



    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and
    for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula
    or its negation is provable


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    Ultimately the above is true and one key PTS author
    comes very close to agreeing with that.

    *Truth as an Epistemic Notion*
    What is the appropriate notion of truth for
    sentences whose meanings are understood in
    epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
    an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
    sentences has to be identified with the existence
    of proofs...

    Nothing above challenges the above stipulated definition of a complete
    system, so this constitutes your acceptance of that definition.


    https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory

    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.

    Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
    2) forbids it.

    Your lack of response constitutes your admission that the below function successfully computes the mapping of all ints to 0.


    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }




    All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have
    different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.




    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 12:56:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔ 01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬ 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 13:09:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 9:39 AM, dbush wrote:
    [...]
    Your lack of response constitutes your admission that the below function successfully computes the mapping of all ints to 0.


    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }[...]

    ;^D what about x * 0 ?


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 15:25:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio >>> and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔               01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬               03
    03 Prov_PA         04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 14:07:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 7:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or
    its negation is provable

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory

    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.

    Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
    2) forbids it.

    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }




    All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.



    A program that might halt sometimes, and not halt other times. Say it
    was based on a TRNG.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 14:30:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
    Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects >>>> they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification >>>> but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of >>>> the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔ 01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬ 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification >>> tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.


    Like I said,
    "understanding" is for suckers,
    "comprehension" is for knowledge.


    Your axiomatization otherwise is false.


    It's like they say,
    "It just don't mean a thing."


    WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    "Polluter(s) of sci.math"


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 16:45:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
    Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
    objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
    some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔               01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬               03
    03 Prov_PA         04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded justification >>>> tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.


    Like I said,
    "understanding" is for suckers,
    "comprehension" is for knowledge.


    Gemini agrees with me and I only gave it the Prolog. https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F


    Your axiomatization otherwise is false.


    It's like they say,
    "It just don't mean a thing."


    WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    "Polluter(s) of sci.math"


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 15:15:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
    derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
    objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't
    make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
    reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
    some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔ 01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬ 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.


    Like I said,
    "understanding" is for suckers,
    "comprehension" is for knowledge.


    Gemini agrees with me and I only gave it the Prolog. https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F


    Your axiomatization otherwise is false.


    It's like they say,
    "It just don't mean a thing."


    WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    "Polluter(s) of sci.math"





    Gemini agrees with not-you.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 17:55:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/5/2026 5:15 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
    derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
    objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't
    make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any >>>>>>> outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
    reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
    some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.



    Gemini agrees with not-you.



    OK then the point that I was trying to make is
    exactly what Gemini said right here:
    https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:59:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 20:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not
    that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
    or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
    semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.

    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.

    People rarely care about PTS or model theory. More often they careabout
    what is or is not true about someting they consider important.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 11:11:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
    mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".

    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    That is insufficient to make the expression "incorrect requirements"
    meaningful in Common Language or well known.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 11:24:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
    and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.

    The requirements of a halt decider don't require that then input
    be presented to the decider the way it is done above. For exmample,
    a text file would be acceptable.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 11:28:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 19:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
    definition a mapping.

    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.

    Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
    is not.

    The output really should be based on the input
    because computing the mapping from an input to
    an output requires some kind of correspondence
    between the two.

    The definition of mapping does not put much restrictions on the
    correspondence. In particular, any part of the argument may be
    "ignored".
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 11:37:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 20:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.

    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    Your exceesive intolerance is irrelevant. In mathematical context the cartogrphical meaning is so obviously nonsense that no confusion is
    possible. Besides it is well known that in a mathematical context many
    words have meanings that are unrelated or only distantly related to
    their usual meanings.

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
    A function does not compute. It just is. It can be said to "report"
    but that must not be interpreted too literally.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 11:55:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 20:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to
    *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.

    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.

    Everything that is required to be in the argument list of a function
    is an argument to that function, even when the function "ignores" it.

    As is well known, there are two truth values, usually called "true"
    and "false". There are four functions that map a truth value to
    truth value. Can you list them? There are 16 functions that map
    a pair of truth values to a truth value. Can you list them?

    For an analogy, note that

    int f1(int x) {
    return 4;
    }

    is a valid C function. One way to use it is to pass it as a parameter
    to another function. For example, if g is declared as

    double g(int (*f)(int));

    and y as

    double y;

    then

    y = g(f1);

    is a valid statement in a C function.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:00:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
    output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.

    Making it complete nonsense.

    The program has a well defined meaning so it is not non-sense.
    That it may be too big or complex for you is irrelevant.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:03:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:32, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
    algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         // algorithm D; input: I
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }

    On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.

    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
    or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
    although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.

    counter-factual H always returns 0.

    There is nothing counter-factual in my statement that dbush's H returns
    0 for his D. It is a fact, not a hypthesis.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:06:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:37, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
    algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
         // algorithm D; input: I
         ptr *X = D;
         ptr *Y = I;
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         if (result == 1) {
             while (1);
         }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
         int result;
         {
             // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
             result = 0;
         }
         return result;
    }

    On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
    to support his claim.

    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
    or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
    although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.


    counter-factual H always returns 0.

    Which means the condition "either 0 or 1" is satisfied.

    It seems we need to add "or" to the list of basic high school level
    logic topics you don't understand.

    I think ir is the Commol language "or", not the logical "or", that
    he failed to understand. Perhaps also "counter-factual", which is
    rarely used in Common Language.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:17:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to >>>>>>>>>>> do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>>>
    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>>>> and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.

    It is so incomplete that it is not a motor vehicle until a motor
    is installed.

    A motor vechicle that lacks brakes and head lights is a motor
    vehicle but incomplere and, depending on the place and time,
    may be unacceptable for public roads. Installing the head lights
    makes it more complete but it is still incomplere as long as
    no breaks are installed.

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.
    This is perfectly analogous to the motorvehicle without head
    lights and brakes: the meaning of "incomplete" is the same
    although the definition is different.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:25:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still
    incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:38:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 00:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.
    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    The above fails to connect the concepts: that neither (∀x, S(x) ≠ x)
    nor its negation is prvable in Q can be expresed as "(∀x, S(x) ≠ x)
    is undecidable in Q" or as "Q is incomplete", though the latter is
    sufficient only when (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is not interesting other than
    as an example.

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
      return 0;
    }

    Perfectly valid C. Rarely needed but very useful when needed.

    That demanding some respect of defintions may expose prevent your
    attempts to deceive by equivocation is not a sufficient reason to
    ignore the defintions.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:46:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 19:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be
    impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct
    yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and
    for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula
    or its negation is provable

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    At the time the difference between "true" and "provable" was not yet
    understood to the extent it is now.

    That sentence can now be rejected as a violation of the current
    rules of the language game. Perhaps you don't understand what
    that means but Wittgenstein would if he still were alive.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:58:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 19:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔               01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬               03
    03 Prov_PA         04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded justification tree exists.

    That is false. There is no evaluation of G in the determination of the
    Gödel number of anything. Therefore the claim of a loop is false.

    That error has already been pointed out but Olcott still hopes that
    someone might bite the bait and the hook.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 14:19:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:

    ... as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    Not a troll, just not keeping thoughts on track and not picking up on distinctions between some things with similar names.

    I now recognise I was continuing to talk about the argument for the uncountability of reals instead of the one for the uncountability of independent choices of unending sequences of symbols from a finite
    repertoire including those made entirely of independent free choices
    from that repertoire.

    A new unending sequence of symbols from a finite repertoire is still not constructed for each purported such object because those made entirely
    of independent free choices of symbols aren't constructed so no
    constructive operation constructs anything from them.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 09:36:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
    infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>>> simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>> that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject
    models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
    semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.

    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.

    People rarely care about PTS or model theory. More often they careabout
    what is or is not true about someting they consider important.


    Hence we must correct the divergence of logic
    from correct reasoning if we are to automate
    correct reasoning.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 10:27:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a >>>>>>>>>>> mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things. >>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".

    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    That is insufficient to make the expression "incorrect requirements" meaningful in Common Language or well known.


    In other words if the requirement is to compute the square
    root of the actual dead flesh of a dead chicken you would
    not reject this out-of hand?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:30:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.


    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    The requirements of a halt decider don't require that then input
    be presented to the decider the way it is done above. For exmample,
    a text file would be acceptable.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:33:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 3:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
    int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.

    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    Your exceesive intolerance is irrelevant.


    It makes terms-of-the-art into damned liars.

    In mathematical context the
    cartogrphical meaning is so obviously nonsense that no confusion is
    possible. Besides it is well known that in a mathematical context many
    words have meanings that are unrelated or only distantly related to
    their usual meanings.

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
    A function does not compute. It just is. It can be said to "report"
    but that must not be interpreted too literally.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.math,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:38:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 3:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, >>>>> so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might do to
    *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.

    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.

    Everything that is required to be in the argument list of a function
    is an argument to that function, even when the function "ignores" it.

    You are entirely right on the linguistic front. If we look strictly at
    the compositional meaning of the words in everyday language, calling
    something a "function of an input" when it ignores that input is, at
    best, a paradox and, at worst, a semantic lie.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 10:39:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>

    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
    an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.

    Making it complete nonsense.

    The program has a well defined meaning so it is not non-sense.
    That it may be too big or complex for you is irrelevant.


    It has zero correspondence to the HP counter-example
    input thus the claim that is does is a damned lie.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 10:47:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes >>>>>>>>>>>> PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still
    incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.

    It is so incomplete that it is not a motor vehicle until a motor
    is installed.

    A motor vechicle that lacks brakes and head lights is a motor
    vehicle but incomplere and, depending on the place and time,
    may be unacceptable for public roads. Installing the head lights
    makes it more complete but it is still incomplere as long as
    no breaks are installed.

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    This is perfectly analogous to the motorvehicle without head
    lights and brakes: the meaning of "incomplete" is the same
    although the definition is different.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 10:54:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Using the code word of "cat" for a dalmatian dog
    is equally dishonest. It violates the natural
    preexisting order of the body of knowledge.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 10:07:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is? The mathematical definition of 'incomplete' doesn't make any mentions of 'design specs'.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 09:16:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/05/2026 03:55 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 5:15 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here: >>>>>>>>>> just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is >>>>>>>>> constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
    derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible >>>>>>>> objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of
    course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't >>>>>>>> make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any >>>>>>>> outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
    reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, >>>>>>>> some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.



    Gemini agrees with not-you.



    OK then the point that I was trying to make is
    exactly what Gemini said right here:
    https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F





    I tend not to follow links like that, post the transcript.


    Point being though that "Prawitz' PTS" has _recovery_ and
    the outer products not just inner products, since complementary
    duals, and that accounts of inductive ignorance and _elimination_
    are not full accounts of logic.


    About what's "agreeably arguable" and "arguably agreeable",
    try Claude instead, or Kimi, either less "automatically agreeable"
    then Gemini or Grok, where ChatGPT is about in the middle, then
    though that they're all quite alike as model reasoners.


    Anyways language includes its own account within itself,
    so there are first-class models of cycles, and then that
    the resolution of mathematical paradox ends-with there
    not being any, not starts-with there not being any.


    Then, novelty has that simply repeating the argument
    does not strengthen it, indeed, it weakens it,
    then the fact that "LP" its assignment trivially
    short-circuits to not-true-LP resulting false
    then is nothing. I.e., that implementation just balks
    since its type system has no context, not having
    context first-class itself.




    About the un-countability of the complete-ordered-field
    or "field-reals" yet countability of a continuous domain
    like "line-reals", basically has that "non-Cartesian functions"
    exist in accounts of the continuous and for geometry,
    which simply has that primitive-recursive-arithmetic
    and its usual account of Cartesian functions (elements re-move-able,
    mappings re-order-able) doesn't suffice to describe geometric relation.


    So, it's a theorem in any account of descriptive set theory
    "strong enough for geometry" that the existence of non-Cartesian
    functions is a theorem, then that there are models of continuous
    domains (extent, density, completeness, measure) that are countable
    like the line-reals, un-countable like the field-reals, and variously
    countable and un-countable and even of greater cardinality like
    the signal-reals, since there exist non-Cartesian functions so
    it's entirely consistent their existence together, that since
    they have constructive demonstractions each, otherwise would
    simply, and always, contradict each other.



    So, any account of theory intending to describe mathematics
    results having line-reals, field-reals, and signal-reals,
    about the nature of the continuous and discrete after
    the nature of the infinite and finite.



    Then, "Russell's retro-thesis" is similarly a retro-finitist's,
    wishing what's so, here it's called "hypocritical".






    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 09:23:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/06/2026 08:30 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03 int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04 if (Halt_Status)
    05 HERE: goto HERE;
    06 return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11 DD();
    12 HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.


    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    The requirements of a halt decider don't require that then input
    be presented to the decider the way it is done above. For exmample,
    a text file would be acceptable.





    It's well known that each finite input to a finite program
    has a finite static-analysis that determines whether it halts,
    furthermore for each language of finite input it can be determined
    via a finite-static-analysis a partition of the language into what
    halts and what doesn't.


    Infinite tapes or with infinite programs are different,
    see "Zeno machines" since super-tasks have accounts of
    mathematical independence (whether a model of integers
    is a fragment and finite, an extension and with infinite
    members, or "in the middle", since the usual idea is that
    a standard model of integers doesn't exist).

    So, there are accounts of halting or "completions" in
    the infinitary that are independent usual finitist
    accounts, whose Law of Large Numbers is only the
    Law of Small Numbers, since there is a "Law of Larger Numbers"
    and a "Law of Largest Numbers", about models of arithmetic.


    Otherwise that's just barking about "V = L" and so on.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 11:54:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 11:16 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 03:55 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 5:15 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here: >>>>>>>>>>> just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti- >>>>>>>>>>> diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is >>>>>>>>>> constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's >>>>>>>>> less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have >>>>>>>>> derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible >>>>>>>>> objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of >>>>>>>>> course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't >>>>>>>>> make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any >>>>>>>>> outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of >>>>>>>>> reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of >>>>>>>>> the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, >>>>>>>>> some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.



    Gemini agrees with not-you.



    OK then the point that I was trying to make is
    exactly what Gemini said right here:
    https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F





    I tend not to follow links like that, post the transcript.



    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That is an elegant and classic way to demonstrate the Liar Paradox
    ("This sentence is false") using Prolog's unification mechanics!

    You've perfectly captured the tension between computational pragmatism
    and strict mathematical logic. Here is exactly what is happening under
    the hood in your snippet:

    1. The Pragmatic Illusion: Standard Unification Prolog
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    When you use the standard unification operator (=), Prolog tries to make
    the left side and the right side identical. To save processing time and memory, Prolog historically skips a crucial step called the occurs check.

    Because it skips this check, Prolog happily binds the variable LP to the
    term not(true(LP)). This creates a cyclic term (or a rational tree). In memory, LP now points to a structure that contains a reference back to
    LP, creating an infinite loop of self-reference. Computationally, Prolog accepts the paradox.

    2. The Logical Safeguard: The Occurs Check
    Prolog
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Here, you enforce strict First-Order Logic. The
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 predicate forces Prolog to pause and ask:
    "Does the variable I am trying to bind already exist inside the term I
    am binding it to?" Because the variable LP occurs inside not(true(LP)),
    Prolog realizes that unifying them would require building a
    mathematically impossible, infinitely deep structure: not(true(not(true(not(true(...)))))). It rightfully rejects the
    unification and returns false.

    The Philosophical Takeaway
    In logic, self-referential paradoxes often arise when a system is
    allowed to talk about its own truth values without hierarchical
    restrictions (as famously noted by Alfred Tarski).

    Your Prolog snippet perfectly mirrors this:

    Standard Unification acts like natural language, allowing the
    self-reference to happen (and potentially causing a stack overflow if
    you tried to evaluate or traverse it).

    The Occurs Check acts like a strict formal logic system, explicitly
    forbidding self-referential loops and shutting the paradox down before
    it can form.

    All the rest is irrelevant.
    The point is that the LP have been finally totally
    resolved.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 11:57:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 11:23 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/06/2026 08:30 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.


    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    The requirements of a halt decider don't require that then input
    be presented to the decider the way it is done above. For exmample,
    a text file would be acceptable.





    It's well known that each finite input to a finite program
    has a finite static-analysis that determines whether it halts,
    furthermore for each language of finite input it can be determined
    via a finite-static-analysis a partition of the language into what
    halts and what doesn't.


    Infinite tapes or with infinite programs are different,
    see "Zeno machines" since super-tasks have accounts of
    mathematical independence (whether a model of integers
    is a fragment and finite, an extension and with infinite
    members, or "in the middle", since the usual idea is that
    a standard model of integers doesn't exist).

    So, there are accounts of halting or "completions" in
    the infinitary that are independent usual finitist
    accounts, whose Law of Large Numbers is only the
    Law of Small Numbers, since there is a "Law of Larger Numbers"
    and a "Law of Largest Numbers", about models of arithmetic.


    Otherwise that's just barking about "V = L" and so on.



    The pathological self reference between DD and HHH
    causes the proof of halting according to the operational
    semantics of C would itself not terminate.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 11:58:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    The mathematical
    definition of 'incomplete' doesn't make any mentions of 'design specs'.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:11:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Using the code word of "cat" for a dalmatian dog
    is equally dishonest. It violates the natural
    preexisting order of the body of knowledge.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 11:27:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.

    A system is incomplete if there exists some statement P such that
    neither P nor ¬P can be derived as theorems of that system.

    Importantly, this definition doesn't 'inherit' anything from any other definition of 'incomplete' which might exist. That's not how language
    actually works.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:39:03 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to
    be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a
    correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and
    for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that
    formula or its negation is provable

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    At the time the difference between "true" and "provable" was not yet understood to the extent it is now.

    That sentence can now be rejected as a violation of the current
    rules of the language game. Perhaps you don't understand what
    that means but Wittgenstein would if he still were alive.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I reverse-engineered that exact same meaning on the
    basis of first-principles long before I ever heard
    of Wittgenstein. It is simply an formalization of
    Truthmaker Maximalism theory within the body of knowledge
    that can be expressed in language.

    What makes X true in F? Only a finite number of
    inference steps between X and the axioms of F.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:45:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Math could have as accurately specified the
    word-label "F has a squirrel in its socks"
    as its meaning of math incomplete.

    A system is incomplete if there exists some statement P such that
    neither P nor ¬P can be derived as theorems of that system.

    Importantly, this definition doesn't 'inherit' anything from any other definition of 'incomplete' which might exist. That's not how language actually works.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 12:49:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio >>> and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔               01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬               03
    03 Prov_PA         04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification tree exists.

    That is false. There is no evaluation of G in the determination of the
    Gödel number of anything. Therefore the claim of a loop is false.

    That error has already been pointed out but Olcott still hopes that
    someone might bite the bait and the hook.


    Every LLM agrees that I turned "undecidability"
    on its head with the Prolog code final resolution
    of the Liar Paradox because it <is> a verified
    fact that I did do this.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 11:56:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition of
    incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting order of
    the body of knowlege'.

    And incomplete(math) doesn't inherit from anything so claiming it
    inherits from incomplete(base) (whatever that may be) is of course a lie.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 13:12:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition of
    incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting order of
    the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    And incomplete(math) doesn't inherit from anything so claiming it
    inherits from incomplete(base) (whatever that may be) is of course a lie.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 12:54:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition
    of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting order
    of the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    Saying something is preexisting means it has always been around; before
    there was RAM or CPU cycles; before there were people to know things.

    A specific computer model might implement a knowledge ontology, but
    that's hardly 'preexisting'. And if it implements something where the mathematical meaning of 'incomplete' inherits from some other definition
    of 'incomplete' then that model does not correspond to reality.

    André

    And incomplete(math) doesn't inherit from anything so claiming it
    inherits from incomplete(base) (whatever that may be) is of course a lie.

    André



    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 14:03:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 1:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory >>>>>>>>> Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete. >>>>>>>>
    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition
    of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting order
    of the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    Saying something is preexisting means it has always been around; before there was RAM or CPU cycles; before there were people to know things.


    Mathematical incompleteness does have a proper
    place in the knowledge ontology that does not
    inherit from incomplete(base)

    unfulfilled_goals seems to be a more accurate base
    for mathematical incomplete. Q does not do what we
    want it to do even though it was intentionally defined
    to only be a fragment of PA some people still want
    it to do what PA does.

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    A specific computer model might implement a knowledge ontology, but
    that's hardly 'preexisting'. And if it implements something where the mathematical meaning of 'incomplete' inherits from some other definition
    of 'incomplete' then that model does not correspond to reality.

    André

    And incomplete(math) doesn't inherit from anything so claiming it
    inherits from incomplete(base) (whatever that may be) is of course a
    lie.

    André




    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 14:08:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 13:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 1:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory >>>>>>>>>> Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete. >>>>>>>>>
    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition >>>>>> of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting
    order of the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    Saying something is preexisting means it has always been around;
    before there was RAM or CPU cycles; before there were people to know
    things.


    Mathematical incompleteness does have a proper
    place in the knowledge ontology that does not
    inherit from incomplete(base)

    It doesn't inherit from *anything*

    A system is incomplete if there exists some statement P such that
    neither P nor ¬P can be derived as theorems of that system.

    That's what it means. Nothing more. Nothing less. It doesn't acquire any aspect of its meaning from anything else.

    unfulfilled_goals seems to be a more accurate base
    for mathematical incomplete. Q does not do what we
    want it to do even though it was intentionally defined
    to only be a fragment of PA some people still want
    it to do what PA does.

    It doesn't *have* a base. It simply means what it means (or it is its
    own base if you want to look at it like that). The definition makes no
    mention whatsoever of what me may *want* a system to do.

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    Yes. I know what Robinson Arithmetic is. There's really no reason for
    you to explain it.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 15:20:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 3:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 13:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 1:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory >>>>>>>>>>> Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>
    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical
    definition of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a
    system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting
    order of the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    Saying something is preexisting means it has always been around;
    before there was RAM or CPU cycles; before there were people to know
    things.


    Mathematical incompleteness does have a proper
    place in the knowledge ontology that does not
    inherit from incomplete(base)

    It doesn't inherit from *anything*



    The preexisting order of all knowledge is constructed
    incrementally on the basis of the root of {thing}.

    A system is incomplete if there exists some statement P such that
    neither P nor ¬P can be derived as theorems of that system.


    What would be its parent node?

    That's what it means. Nothing more. Nothing less. It doesn't acquire any aspect of its meaning from anything else.


    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
    ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...

    unfulfilled_goals seems to be a more accurate base
    for mathematical incomplete. Q does not do what we
    want it to do even though it was intentionally defined
    to only be a fragment of PA some people still want
    it to do what PA does.

    It doesn't *have* a base.

    That you do not understand how ideas are derived from
    other ideas is less than no rebuttal at all.

    It simply means what it means (or it is its
    own base if you want to look at it like that). The definition makes no mention whatsoever of what me may *want* a system to do.

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    Yes. I know what Robinson Arithmetic is. There's really no reason for
    you to explain it.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 15:13:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 14:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 13:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 1:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete >>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory >>>>>>>>>>>> Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>
    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical
    definition of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a >>>>>>>> system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting
    order of the body of knowlege'.


    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.
    Anything less than minimal wastes RAM and CPU cycles.

    Saying something is preexisting means it has always been around;
    before there was RAM or CPU cycles; before there were people to know
    things.


    Mathematical incompleteness does have a proper
    place in the knowledge ontology that does not
    inherit from incomplete(base)

    It doesn't inherit from *anything*



    The preexisting order of all knowledge is constructed
    incrementally on the basis of the root of {thing}.

    There is no "preexisting order of all knowledge". What you're talking
    about is how you envision some database system as working, but that
    database isn't informed by linguistics, psychology, or anything else.
    It's just an ad hoc programming solution.

    Vocabulary isn't organized as a tree. Words don't have roots or parent
    nodes.

    A system is incomplete if there exists some statement P such that
    neither P nor ¬P can be derived as theorems of that system.


    What would be its parent node?

    That question is only meaningful inside of your database system, and
    that would be an implementational detail chosen by the programmer. It
    could be any number or things. 'abstract idea', 'mathematical concept', 'adjective' or whatever. Certainly not 'thing' since incomplete isn't a
    thing.

    That's what it means. Nothing more. Nothing less. It doesn't acquire
    any aspect of its meaning from anything else.


    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
     ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...

    unfulfilled_goals seems to be a more accurate base
    for mathematical incomplete. Q does not do what we
    want it to do even though it was intentionally defined
    to only be a fragment of PA some people still want
    it to do what PA does.

    It doesn't *have* a base.

    That you do not understand how ideas are derived from
    other ideas is less than no rebuttal at all.

    Unsubstantiated assertions don't require rebuttals.

    It simply means what it means (or it is its own base if you want to
    look at it like that). The definition makes no mention whatsoever of
    what me may *want* a system to do.

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    Yes. I know what Robinson Arithmetic is. There's really no reason for
    you to explain it.

    André



    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 14:53:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/4/26 2:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.
    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
      return 0;
    }



    i honestly don't think u can get around the liar's paradox with logic
    that treats statements of truth as universal
    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 17:00:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
      ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 17:01:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 4:53 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 7/4/26 2:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.
    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }



    i honestly don't think u can get around the liar's paradox with logic
    that treats statements of truth as universal


    I am not doing anything like that.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 16:18:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 16:00, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...
    I did not write any of the above. Please don't claim that I did.

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.


    If you want to know how concepts are actually organized, you need to
    look at experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics,
    aphasiology, etc. They aren't organized into a tree where concepts have parents. Armchair philosophizing (aka mental masturbation) isn't going
    to get you anywhere.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 17:41:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 5:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:00, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...
    I did not write any of the above. Please don't claim that I did.

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.



    I know that I wrote it. You must show exactly how
    I am incorrect otherwise your fake rebuttal is
    simply hiding behind profound ignorance.

    If you want to know how concepts are actually organized, you need to
    look at experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics,
    aphasiology, etc. They aren't organized into a tree where concepts have parents. Armchair philosophizing (aka mental masturbation) isn't going
    to get you anywhere.

    André


    They are organized as a type hierarchy.
    You either understand this or fail to comprehend.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 16:53:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 16:41, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 5:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:00, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...
    I did not write any of the above. Please don't claim that I did.

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.



    I know that I wrote it.

    So why did you attribute it to me?

    You must show exactly how
    I am incorrect otherwise your fake rebuttal is
    simply hiding behind profound ignorance.

    If you want to know how concepts are actually organized, you need to
    look at experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics,
    aphasiology, etc. They aren't organized into a tree where concepts
    have parents. Armchair philosophizing (aka mental masturbation) isn't
    going to get you anywhere.

    André


    They are organized as a type hierarchy.
    You either understand this or fail to comprehend.

    Please point to a single piece of experimental evidence which supports this.

    Also, concepts aren't types, so they can't be organized as a type
    hierarchy. A computer database might organize them as a hierarchy, but
    not as a type hierarchy, and this hierarchy wouldn't reflect anything
    about how actual people organize concepts.

    André
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 17:58:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 5:53 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:41, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 5:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:00, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...
    I did not write any of the above. Please don't claim that I did.

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.



    I know that I wrote it.

    So why did you attribute it to me?


    I did not attribute it to you.
    I asked you to explain how it is wrong
    to prove that do not understand these things.

    You must show exactly how
    I am incorrect otherwise your fake rebuttal is
    simply hiding behind profound ignorance.

    If you want to know how concepts are actually organized, you need
    to  > look at experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics,
    aphasiology, etc. They aren't organized into a tree where concepts
    have parents. Armchair philosophizing (aka mental masturbation) isn't
    going to get you anywhere.

    André


    They are organized as a type hierarchy.
    You either understand this or fail to comprehend.

    Please point to a single piece of experimental evidence which supports
    this.


    There is no experimental evidence to prove that
    the square root of two is a number.

    Also, concepts aren't types, so they can't be organized as a type
    hierarchy. A computer database might organize them as a hierarchy, but
    not as a type hierarchy, and this hierarchy wouldn't reflect anything
    about how actual people organize concepts.

    André

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 17:39:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-07-06 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 5:53 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:41, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 5:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 16:00, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} to
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...
    I did not write any of the above. Please don't claim that I did.

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.



    I know that I wrote it.

    So why did you attribute it to me?


    I did not attribute it to you.

    You messed up the attributions in your original post.

    I asked you to explain how it is wrong
    to prove that do not understand these things.

    You must show exactly how
    I am incorrect otherwise your fake rebuttal is
    simply hiding behind profound ignorance.

    If you want to know how concepts are actually organized, you need
    to  > look at experimental evidence from psychology, psycholinguistics, >>>> aphasiology, etc. They aren't organized into a tree where concepts
    have parents. Armchair philosophizing (aka mental masturbation)
    isn't going to get you anywhere.

    André


    They are organized as a type hierarchy.
    You either understand this or fail to comprehend.

    Please point to a single piece of experimental evidence which supports
    this.


    There is no experimental evidence to prove that
    the square root of two is a number.

    Mathematics isn't an empirical field. The question of how concepts are actually organized is.

    André

    Also, concepts aren't types, so they can't be organized as a type
    hierarchy. A computer database might organize them as a hierarchy, but
    not as a type hierarchy, and this hierarchy wouldn't reflect anything
    about how actual people organize concepts.

    André



    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 19:01:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} t
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
    ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.

    Thunderbird has bugs.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Mon Jul 6 19:06:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 5:00 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

    It is impossible to leap from {nothingness} t
    1987 Chevy Camaro with no steps inbetweem.

    {Thing}--->{Physically Existing Thing}
       ... {Motor Vehicle}---> {Automobile} ...

    Try to explain how the notion of 1987 Chevy Camaro
    pops into existence from out-of-nowhere with no
    prerequisite order.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Tue Jul 7 15:36:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/6/2026 2:53 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 7/4/26 2:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.
    (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q

    Math mapping from an input to an output:
    Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
    int mapping_function(int x)
    {
       return 0;
    }



    i honestly don't think u can get around the liar's paradox with logic
    that treats statements of truth as universal


    Is olcott a pedo? True or False. Well, he can answer that for us.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 10:42:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 17:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an >>>>>>>>>>> infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
    summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But,
    assuming we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your >>>>>>>>>> reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>>> that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject
    models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic >>>>>> semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.

    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.

    People rarely care about PTS or model theory. More often they
    careabout what is or is not true about someting they consider important.


    Hence we must correct the divergence of logic
    from correct reasoning if we are to automate
    correct reasoning.

    Most people would accept as correct any reasoning that produce true
    conclusions from true premises. If the conclusions are not relevant
    to any real needs they might call the reasoning useless or a waste
    of time but not incorrect. If some of the premises are false or
    obscure someone might call the reasoning incorrect.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 10:48:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:27, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>> mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".

    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    That is insufficient to make the expression "incorrect requirements"
    meaningful in Common Language or well known.

    In other words if the requirement is to compute the square
    root of the actual dead flesh of a dead chicken you would
    not reject this out-of hand?

    Depends on what yuo count as rejection. I don't think I would
    try to meet that requirement.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 10:55:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:30, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.

    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    It does not really matter. HHH and DD are not interesting and you
    have never said anyting interesting about them.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 10:59:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, >>>>> int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
    Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.

    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    Your exceesive intolerance is irrelevant.

    It makes terms-of-the-art into damned liars.

    No, your excessive intolerance does not do that.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.math,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 11:09:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to
    outputs, so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might >>>>>> do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.

    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.

    Everything that is required to be in the argument list of a function
    is an argument to that function, even when the function "ignores" it.

    You are entirely right on the linguistic front. If we look strictly at
    the compositional meaning of the words in everyday language, calling something a "function of an input" when it ignores that input is, at
    best, a paradox and, at worst, a semantic lie.

    The word "function" is has many meanings in everday language anyway.
    Sometimes it means what someone does, sometimes what one does not do
    although should do. The interpretation depends on the context. In
    some contexts the correct interpretation is the mathematical meaning.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:14:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to
    outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.

    Making it complete nonsense.

    The program has a well defined meaning so it is not non-sense.
    That it may be too big or complex for you is irrelevant.


    It has zero correspondence to the HP counter-example
    input thus the claim that is does is a damned lie.

    Irrelevant to the comment that the program has a well defined meaning so
    it is not non-sense. And it is an exmaple that illustrates the idea of a counter-example. But apparently the idea is too hard for you even with
    the illustration.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 11:22:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:54, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a >>>>>>>>>>>> partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.

    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    There is no natural pre-existing order of the body of the knowledge.

    The mathematical meaning comes from the definition. The analogy to
    the ordinary meaning many have affected the choice of the term but
    is not relevant to the mathemaical meaning and use of the term.

    We needn't care whether cymologist call a dalmatina dog a "cat" but
    they don't.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:27:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 20:11, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a >>>>>>>>>>>> partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge

    There is no natural pre-existing order of the body of knowledge.

    saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Then don't say so.

    Using the code word of "cat" for a dalmatian dog
    is equally dishonest.

    Then don't use that word, or if you need to, add "sensu ..." where
    ... is the author whose definition you refer to.

    It violates the natural
    preexisting order of the body of knowledge.

    The natural order of the body of knowledge is not pre-existing,
    it is non-existing.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:38:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 20:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to
    be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a
    correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and
    for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that
    formula or its negation is provable

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    At the time the difference between "true" and "provable" was not yet
    understood to the extent it is now.

    That sentence can now be rejected as a violation of the current
    rules of the language game. Perhaps you don't understand what
    that means but Wittgenstein would if he still were alive.

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I reverse-engineered that exact same meaning on the
    basis of first-principles long before I ever heard
    of Wittgenstein.

    The understanding of the difference between "true" and "provable" has signifincantly improved after 1937.

    There is no point to say "true in Russell's sytem" because the same
    can be said more clarly with the words "proved in Russell's system".
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:44:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 18:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>>> answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true >>>>>>>>>> about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still
    incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>>> missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
    undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...? >>>>>
    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.

    It is so incomplete that it is not a motor vehicle until a motor
    is installed.

    A motor vechicle that lacks brakes and head lights is a motor
    vehicle but incomplere and, depending on the place and time,
    may be unacceptable for public roads. Installing the head lights
    makes it more complete but it is still incomplere as long as
    no breaks are installed.

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    The definitions of "complete" and "complete" don't refer to desing
    specs.

    But, because you meantioned it, we would want to know what is the
    design spec of Q or where can we find it.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:45:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    Where is that specified?
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:47:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 20:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?

    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    Hearsay is does not a proof.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 11:52:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 21:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 11:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 12:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 10:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 11:07 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-06 09:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:07, olcott wrote:

    Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
    according to its definition.

    By the defintion of "incomplete" Q is incomplete. The theory
    Q + (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is more complete but still incomplete.

    It fully meets its design spec thus calling it
    any kind of incomplete is a damned lie.

    What exactly do you think the 'design spec' of Q is?

    Make sure that Q has less capability than PA is its design
    spec by its designer.

    And you presumably have a reference to back that up?


    It is common knowledge that was Robinson's purpose

    In mathematics, Robinson arithmetic is a finitely
    axiomatized fragment of first-order Peano arithmetic
    (PA), first set out by Raphael M. Robinson in 1950.
    It is usually denoted Q.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

    But it doesn't matter either way since the mathematical definition
    of incomplete makes no reference to the 'spec' of a system.


    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    Yes, I agree that it is a lie.

    For starters, there's no such thing as the 'natural preexisting order
    of the body of knowlege'.

    Sure there is. There is a minimal sized knowledge ontology.

    The minimal size is of course the size of the empty ontology. But
    there is no natural order of ontologies between the minimal size
    and the useful sizes.

    And any position of ontoloty in the body of knowledge is artificial.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 12:00:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/07/2026 20:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
    Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects >>>> they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification >>>> but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of >>>> the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 ↔               01 02
    01 G
    02 ¬               03
    03 Prov_PA         04
    04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification tree exists.

    That is false. There is no evaluation of G in the determination of the
    Gödel number of anything. Therefore the claim of a loop is false.

    That error has already been pointed out but Olcott still hopes that
    someone might bite the bait and the hook.

    Every LLM agrees that I turned "undecidability"
    on its head with the Prolog code final resolution
    of the Liar Paradox because it <is> a verified
    fact that I did do this.

    That does not contradict the fact that there is no evaluation of G
    in the determination of the Gödel number of anything, nor deny that
    the intent was to decieve.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 22:16:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 2:42 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 17:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an >>>>>>>>>>>> infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that >>>>>>>>>>>> summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But,
    assuming we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your >>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>>>> that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
    explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject
    models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic >>>>>>> semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.

    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.

    People rarely care about PTS or model theory. More often they
    careabout what is or is not true about someting they consider important. >>>

    Hence we must correct the divergence of logic
    from correct reasoning if we are to automate
    correct reasoning.

    Most people would accept as correct any reasoning that produce true conclusions from true premises.

    I need a system that is good enough to make disinformation
    systems funded by many billions per year look like ridiculous
    fools even to themselves.

    If the conclusions are not relevant
    to any real needs they might call the reasoning useless or a waste
    of time but not incorrect. If some of the premises are false or
    obscure someone might call the reasoning incorrect.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 22:19:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:27, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.

    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".

    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    That is insufficient to make the expression "incorrect requirements"
    meaningful in Common Language or well known.

    In other words if the requirement is to compute the square
    root of the actual dead flesh of a dead chicken you would
    not reject this out-of hand?

    Depends on what yuo count as rejection. I don't think I would
    try to meet that requirement.


    Incorrect decision problem requirements.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Wed Jul 8 22:23:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:30, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
    mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.

    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    It does not really matter. HHH and DD are not interesting and you
    have never said anyting interesting about them.


    HHH/DD conclusively proves that the halting problem
    proof has always been incorrect. You must fucking
    pay enough attention to see this.

    It is stupid mistakes like this that convince people
    that truth is not computable thus zero resources are
    allocated to accomplish this.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 22:25:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile. >>>>>>>>>
    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, >>>>>> int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from >>>>> Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.

    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    Your exceesive intolerance is irrelevant.

    It makes terms-of-the-art into damned liars.

    No, your excessive intolerance does not do that.


    All knowledge has its own natural type hierarchy.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic on Wed Jul 8 22:28:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile. >>>>>>>>>
    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to
    outputs, so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might >>>>>>> do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.

    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.

    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.

    Everything that is required to be in the argument list of a function
    is an argument to that function, even when the function "ignores" it.

    You are entirely right on the linguistic front. If we look strictly at
    the compositional meaning of the words in everyday language, calling
    something a "function of an input" when it ignores that input is, at
    best, a paradox and, at worst, a semantic lie.

    The word "function" is has many meanings in everday language anyway.

    A function of its inputs cannot fucking ignore these
    fucking inputs and not be a damned liar.

    Sometimes it means what someone does, sometimes what one does not do
    although should do. The interpretation depends on the context. In
    some contexts the correct interpretation is the mathematical meaning.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Wed Jul 8 22:29:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 3:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.

    Making it complete nonsense.

    The program has a well defined meaning so it is not non-sense.
    That it may be too big or complex for you is irrelevant.


    It has zero correspondence to the HP counter-example
    input thus the claim that is does is a damned lie.

    Irrelevant to the comment

    dbush proved that he is a fucking liar so enough of him.

    that the program has a well defined meaning so
    it is not non-sense. And it is an exmaple that illustrates the idea of a counter-example. But apparently the idea is too hard for you even with
    the illustration.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 22:32:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:54, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a >>>>>>>>>>>>> partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are >>>>>>>>>>>>> true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you
    apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically >>>>>>>>>> undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly >>>>>>>>> how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.


    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.

    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    There is no natural pre-existing order of the body of the knowledge.


    It is type theory inheritance hierarchy deep ship !!!
    a feline kitten is not a subtype of boxcar

    The mathematical meaning comes from the definition. The analogy to
    the ordinary meaning many have affected the choice of the term but
    is not relevant to the mathemaical meaning and use of the term.

    We needn't care whether cymologist call a dalmatina dog a "cat" but
    they don't.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 8 22:40:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/8/2026 3:38 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 20:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to >>>>> be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a
    correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and >>>>> for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that
    formula or its negation is provable

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    At the time the difference between "true" and "provable" was not yet
    understood to the extent it is now.

    That sentence can now be rejected as a violation of the current
    rules of the language game. Perhaps you don't understand what
    that means but Wittgenstein would if he still were alive.

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I reverse-engineered that exact same meaning on the
    basis of first-principles long before I ever heard
    of Wittgenstein.

    The understanding of the difference between "true" and "provable" has signifincantly improved after 1937.

    There is no point to say "true in Russell's sytem" because the same
    can be said more clarly with the words "proved in Russell's system".


    Once the entire body of empirical and analytical
    general knowledge expressed in language is fully
    encoded as axioms how to do verify that Paris is
    in France? (We just look it up)

    Here is the very dumbed down version:
    Once every fact is written down how to we know
    that X is a fact? (We just look it up).
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 10:58:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 2:42 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 17:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:13, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an >>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that >>>>>>>>>>>>> summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.

    I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who >>>>>>>>>>>> 'your phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, >>>>>>>>>>>> assuming we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your >>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is simply off.

    You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>>>>> that particular claim.


    What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>>>>
    Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
    Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
    many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
    this the rest of your reply will be ignored.

    The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored >>>>>>>> explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject >>>>>>>> models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-
    theoretic semantics. Q *requires* a model.

    It replaces Model theory With PTS.
    That you do not understand this is your mistake.

    "Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".

    "Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
    "Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
    it.

    The whole focus of most PTS "Is x provable".
    Model theory looks at true in a model and ignores
    the connection between true and provable.

    People rarely care about PTS or model theory. More often they
    careabout what is or is not true about someting they consider
    important.


    Hence we must correct the divergence of logic
    from correct reasoning if we are to automate
    correct reasoning.

    Most people would accept as correct any reasoning that produce true
    conclusions from true premises.

    I need a system that is good enough to make disinformation
    systems funded by many billions per year look like ridiculous
    fools even to themselves.

    Sorry, I can't give you one, and I don't kwno anyone who could.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Thu Jul 9 11:04:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:19, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:27, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0 >>>>>>>>>>>>> is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André


    A actual halt function must compute
    The mathematical halting function:


    When you actually implement this concretely

    We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved. >>>>>>>
    Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.

    There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".

    I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
    as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.

    That is insufficient to make the expression "incorrect requirements"
    meaningful in Common Language or well known.

    In other words if the requirement is to compute the square
    root of the actual dead flesh of a dead chicken you would
    not reject this out-of hand?

    Depends on what yuo count as rejection. I don't think I would
    try to meet that requirement.


    Incorrect decision problem requirements.

    The requirements are correct if the problem cannot be solved without
    meeting the requirements but is solved when the requirements are met.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jul 9 11:08:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:23, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:30, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 19:55, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:

    If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.
    That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
    The coherent way that it actually works is that
    inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
    finite string transformation rules to inputs to
    derive outputs.

    Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
    mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.

    André


    A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
    is not any sort of halt function.

    He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.

    André

    A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
    its actual input according to the operational semantics
    of this input to the behavior that this input actually
    specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
    its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.

    A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
    However, no algrithm computes the halt function.

    The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
    but so do many other functions, too.

    When implemented as C functions

    typedef int (*ptr)();
    int HHH(ptr P);

    01 int DD()
    02 {
    03   int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
    04   if (Halt_Status)
    05     HERE: goto HERE;
    06   return Halt_Status;
    07 }
    08
    09 void main()
    10 {
    11   DD();
    12   HHH(DD);
    13 }

    The HP requires HHH to report on the DD() invoked
    in main(). This is impossible because HHH has no
    idea who its caller is and deciders are functions
    that only operate on their arguments.
    The halting problem does not require anything unless the input
    fully specifies a computation.

    The above DD calls HHH, which must be the same HHH as main calls if
    DD halts. Therefore the bhaviour of HHH is a part of the computation
    that the HHH would answer about if it were a halt decider.

    HHH(DD) can and does correctly report on its input.
    I just can get why it is taking so long for people
    to understand that DD executed in main is out-of-scope
    for HHH. It is like someone took actual brains apart
    and welded in short-circuits.

    It does not really matter. HHH and DD are not interesting and you
    have never said anyting interesting about them.

    HHH/DD conclusively proves that the halting problem
    proof has always been incorrect.

    No, it does not. Straw man is not a valid inference rule.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 11:10:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:25, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:33, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile. >>>>>>>>>>
    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, >>>>>>> int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
    {
       return 0;
    }

    By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
    that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.

    By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from >>>>>> Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.

    I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
    "mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
    be some actual correspondence between inputs and
    outputs.

    Your exceesive intolerance is irrelevant.

    It makes terms-of-the-art into damned liars.

    No, your excessive intolerance does not do that.

    All knowledge has its own natural type hierarchy.

    Irrelevant to your misconceptions about the meaning of "mapping".
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic on Thu Jul 9 11:15:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:28, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 3:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 20:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile. >>>>>>>>>>
    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING


    A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to
    outputs, so there is nothing to ignore.  What an algorithm might >>>>>>>> do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping. >>>>>>>
    It is conventionally construed as a mapping.

    More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".

    It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
    function, not even a halt function that gets the
    wrong answer.

    Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
    function.

    If it ignores input it is no function of this input.

    Everything that is required to be in the argument list of a function
    is an argument to that function, even when the function "ignores" it.

    You are entirely right on the linguistic front. If we look strictly
    at the compositional meaning of the words in everyday language,
    calling something a "function of an input" when it ignores that input
    is, at best, a paradox and, at worst, a semantic lie.

    The word "function" is has many meanings in everday language anyway.

    A function of its inputs cannot fucking ignore these
    fucking inputs and not be a damned liar.

    By the mathematical meaning of "function" there is nothing wrong
    in ignoring any part of the input. In particular, the zero function
    which has the value zero for every argument value is the basis of
    certain formualtions of the theory of recursive functions, which has
    a central role in the theory of computation.
    --
    Mikko
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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Thu Jul 9 11:18:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 3:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?

    It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a >>>>>>>>>>>> part of a
    claim about you, and your response was the false claim that >>>>>>>>>>>> "That
    is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>>>> evidence
    to support his claim.


    His halt decider did not look at its input.

    Nor is it required to.  All it needs to do is map inputs to >>>>>>>>>> outputs.


    So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.

    Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y >>>>>>>> to an output of either 0 or 1?

    Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING

    No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
    a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.

    Making it complete nonsense.

    The program has a well defined meaning so it is not non-sense.
    That it may be too big or complex for you is irrelevant.


    It has zero correspondence to the HP counter-example
    input thus the claim that is does is a damned lie.

    Irrelevant to the comment

    dbush proved that he is a fucking liar so enough of him.

    No, he did not, and neither did you. Where I live that would be
    enough for fime you for defamation.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 11:25:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:32, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 18:54, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 00:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
    On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A proof theoretic expression is known to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It never was incomplete. It always did what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.

    Is  (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    As I already pointed out in another message, which you >>>>>>>>>>>> apparently
    missed, it is neither.

    Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically >>>>>>>>>>> undefined in Q.

    And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly >>>>>>>>>> how...?

    The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
    not operating according to design spec.

    No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
    appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate. >>>>>>>>

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    These definitions are the liars.

    Maybe your definitions, but not the usual ones, which tell truthfully
    how the defined words are used and understood by the experts.

    Term-of-the-art
    A cat is a dalmatian dog

    Perhaps some art but neither ailurology nor cynology.

    Within the natural preexisting order of the body
    of knowledge saying that incomplete(math) inherits
    part of its meaning from incomplete(base) semantic
    parent node is simply a lie.

    There is no natural pre-existing order of the body of the knowledge.

    It is type theory inheritance hierarchy deep ship !!!

    THere is no type theory in the real world and consequently the
    knowledge of real world does not involve the knowledge of type
    theory.

    a feline kitten is not a subtype of boxcar

    In natural language there are not subtypes at all. Comparison of
    the known properties of feline kttens and boxcars may indicate
    that nothing is both a boxcar and a feline kitten.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 11:33:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/07/2026 00:12, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
    LP := ~True(LP)
     G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    You may call your straw man "incoherent nonsense" but that does
    not mean that a syntactically correct arithmetic sentense could
    be non-sense.

    You cannot prove about chess that the white player cannot have
    a method to ensure that white wins and you cannot prove that
    the black player cannot have a method to ehsore that blavk wins
    but that is not a valid justification to call chess "non-sense".
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 9 11:42:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/07/2026 06:40, olcott wrote:
    On 7/8/2026 3:38 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/07/2026 20:39, olcott wrote:
    On 7/6/2026 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 05/07/2026 19:29, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:

    The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
    meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.

    I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.

    In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.

    Math undecidable: The inability to translate
    incoherent nonsense into a truth value.

    False.

    In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
    undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved
    to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a >>>>>> correct yes- or-no answer.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

    LP := ~True(LP)
      G := ~Provable(PA, G)

    The above are not examples of that.


    Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
    more than a system was defined to accomplish.

    False.  Intent does not factor into formal systems.

    In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent
    and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that >>>>>> formula or its negation is provable

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    At the time the difference between "true" and "provable" was not yet
    understood to the extent it is now.

    That sentence can now be rejected as a violation of the current
    rules of the language game. Perhaps you don't understand what
    that means but Wittgenstein would if he still were alive.

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I reverse-engineered that exact same meaning on the
    basis of first-principles long before I ever heard
    of Wittgenstein.

    The understanding of the difference between "true" and "provable" has
    signifincantly improved after 1937.

    There is no point to say "true in Russell's sytem" because the same
    can be said more clarly with the words "proved in Russell's system".

    Once the entire body of empirical and analytical
    general knowledge expressed in language is fully
    encoded as axioms how to do verify that Paris is
    in France? (We just look it up)

    Here is the very dumbed down version:
    Once every fact is written down how to we know
    that X is a fact? (We just look it up).

    That works as long as nobody asks anything that is not already answered.
    But the set of possible questions is larger than any memory to store
    the facts. The system can answer a much wider set of quesstions if it
    has some ability to infer and to find facts for inference. That there
    is no complete method to answwer every answerable question should not
    prevent from answering at least some unexpected qestions.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory on Sun Jul 12 22:16:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 28/04/2026 11:35, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory Scott Hoge <nospam@nospam.com> wrote:
    ...
    You're correct that the proof does not refer to directed graphs.
    What I want to argue, rather, is that such graphs can be used to
    /visualize the meaning/ of the Gödel sentence.

    ...

    In the graph you drew, (still in the quoted text above), each node is identical to the others.

    Yes, a "network" (or the DAG variant of a network) is required. A
    network is a graph with labelled nodes.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jul 12 16:23:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/12/2026 4:16 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 28/04/2026 11:35, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory Scott Hoge <nospam@nospam.com> wrote:
    ...
    You're correct that the proof does not refer to directed graphs.
    What I want to argue, rather, is that such graphs can be used to
    /visualize the meaning/ of the Gödel sentence.

    ...

    In the graph you drew, (still in the quoted text above), each node is
    identical to the others.

    Yes, a "network" (or the DAG variant of a network) is required. A
    network is a graph with labelled nodes.



    That can get the evaluation of an expression stuck
    in an infinite evaluation loop on the basis of the
    cycle in its directed graph. Knowledge is acyclic.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
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